Publications
RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.7, April 2004
THE ELECTIONS AND THE "DEATH OF RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY"
RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.6, March 2004
MODERNIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDST OF THE ELECTION
RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.5, February 2004
FOREIGN POLICY IN PUTIN’S SECOND TERM
RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.7, April 2004
THE ELECTIONS AND THE “DEATH OF RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY”
Vyacheslav Nikonov
President of the POLITY Foundation
It seems that the results of the presidential elections on March 14 are of interest to no one. Cynics are telling a joke: Putin liked the inauguration somuch he bought himself an automatic inaugurator. In the West and liberal circles in Russia, scores lament the untimely end of Russian democracy. Are things really that bad? Is democracy really dead? I’m not so sure. I think it is a case of the glass being either half-full or half-empty.
First, you can’t bury that which has not yet truly been born. Only the extremely naïve can consider the political regime of Yeltsin’s Russia to be democratic. Yes, it saw the first institutions of democracy sprout in Russia — there were competitive elections, a parliament convened. But anarchy and lack of any sort of leadership were the dominant traits of the regime. This
was combined with the oligarchy — through corruption, businessmen close to Yeltsin acquired multi-billiondollar properties and opened any door in the Kremlin with their left foot. Add to this an eastern despotism, since it is only in sultanates or emirates that the family of the head of state really governs.
Today the same institutions — elections, parliament — are in place. The oligarchs are kept at a distance from the levers of power, and Putin’s relatives do not lead the country. We have moved not from Yeltsin-style democracy to a kind of new autocracy but rather from total anarchy to moderate anarchy. Some entrepreneurs and citizens have even started to pay taxes.
Second, this trajectory does not disturb me so much as it inspires my optimism. As a rule, the government takeover of Boris Berezovsky’s TV station, Gazprom’s acquisition of Vladimir Gusinsky’s TV station, and the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky
are cited as proof of “the end of democracy.” Acknowledging that these events are not exactly immaculate, people’s views of them depend on their feelings for individual oligarchs, which is fair. Only a person who knows nothing about these men could
consider Berezovsky a democrat or Khodorkovsky a model taxpayer.
In light of all this, it hardly makes sense to ignore the many signs of progress towards greater democracy. It is impossible to imagine another scene of tanks shooting at a democratically elected parliament as we saw in 1993. It is impossible to imagine the Communists’ return to power as in 1996 when such a scenario was more than realistic.
There is even progress in the electoral process. As an insider to all the Russian elections of the post-Soviet period, I can say with complete confidence that the 2003-2004 campaigns were cleaner and more transparent than, say, those of 1996 or 1999.
Third, elections can be considered fair if they adequately reflect the current preferences of the public. It is laughable to see Putin’s victory as the result of some sort of campaign manipulation. The current level of support for the President was established three years ago, and since then not one poll has shown a decline.
Putin’s problem in the March elections was not getting as many votes as possible but getting too many with the inevitable risk of accusations of dictatorship (although in the recent Georgian elections, which the West recognized as the height of democracy, the winner received 97% of votes).
Putin is popular not because of any democratic deficit. In the last four years the Russian economy grew at an average rate of 6.8% per year, and the population’s earnings increased even faster.
Next to his predecessor, Putin wins by contrast in the eyes of voters: he is young, sober, energetic, and Russians don’t have to be ashamed of him.
Moreover, Putin had no serious challengers. Those who could have given him any competition — Zhirinovsky,
Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, Nemtsov — cravenly withdrew to the shadows, from which the majority of them have yet to emerge. They, not Putin, chose their fate.
Fourth, democracy in its clean and ideal forms doesn’t just appear. The development of democracy takes time. In the United States’ first hundred years of democracy, slavery existed; in the first 150 years, women couldn’t vote; and in the first 190 years, blacks couldn’t either.
In Russia, democratic institutions are developing 12 years after a millennium of totalitarianism or, at best, of strict authoritarianism. By average world standards, democracy in Russia is developing at breakneck pace. The latest issue of Foreign Affairs opens with the article “A Normal Country.” Its authors, Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, argue that, for a
state at its level of development, Russia is normal to the point of being boring. Its democratic institutions are not that advanced compared with countries where democracy goes back a few centuries. But in comparison with the majority of democratic states in the world from Latin America to East Asia, Russia doesn’t look bad.
In the jargon of transitional politics, Russia’s current regime is not authoritarian at all but an undeveloped or unconsolidated democracy. Such a regime does not necessarily become a mature democracy. But it is far from hopeless. It simply needs time. And its demos are conscientious citizens who are striving to remake their lives on their own.
RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.6, March 2004
MODERNIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDST OF THE ELECTION
On February 12, Putin gave a televised speech at Moscow State University to an audience of his supporters. The speech drew much attention, above all because Putin’s opponents charged that it violated campaign rules.
However, it seems that this speech deserved attention for completely different reasons: it would not be an exaggeration to say that it was one of the most important speeches of Putin’s presidency and possibly of all Russian presidencies as well. I am writing this with a certain degree of knowledge and self-criticism, for I co-authored several speeches for two previous presidents.
What Putin proposed was a broad and detailed program for a “modernization breakthrough” in Russia, which is to take place in his last four years in office.
According to the President, Russia must quickly complete the creation of a modern, competitive state that is capable of ensuring even greater economic growth rates and prosperity through the implementation of reforms in the realm of administration, pensions and taxes, as well as financial and military reforms; this is in addition to transforming housing and communal services, fighting corruption in the law-enforcement structures, etc.
Furthermore, all of these changes are to take place within strengthened democratic institutions.
I carefully studied the speech and mentally applauded the President, but then thought to myself, “With the current government, his proposal will continue to be merely a proposal.”
The oligarch-friendly cabinet headed by Mikhail Kasyanov was caution itself, as all the reforms mentioned by the President have been stuck in his governmental committees for years.
Economic growth in the past four years was considerable, but the degree to which our economy was reformed falls short in comparison with our neighbors like, for example, Kazakhstan. There, GDP rates are already increasing twice as fast as in Russia. Putin and his administration have repeatedly criticized the cabinet of ministers precisely for its sluggishness and lack of ambition in its planning.
And this is happening while the President carries an absolute majority in the Duma and thus any reform is conceivable and capable of being carried out.
When Putin unexpectedly dismissed the government on February 24, for me this was an indication of his resolute intention to generate a modernization breakthrough. Moreover, he clearly had become concerned with his place in history.
But the question remains of why the President decided to discharge his cabinet at this time, since by law the same thing has to be done again following the election?
The reason seems to be clear. If procedural changes in the government were to go according to schedule, the new cabinet would not begin its work until the middle of summer, which means that no work could be started until that time.
Now, however, there is a chance that the delayed and problematic administrative reform (which is supposed to reduce the bureaucratic apparatus, together with the number of ministries and their regulatory functions, by one-third) will be completed in the next few weeks. Thus, the new cabinet will be formed according to the new structure and begin its work in April.
To sum up, the primary reasons for an early dismissal of the government correspond with the content of Putin’s second presidential term. But of course, everything that takes place during the election campaign concerns political tactics.
The introduction of a new topic into the election campaign – particularly one regarding the creation of a new government – intensifies its significance and makes it more interesting.
It is no secret that up to this point there has been no real intrigue or drama. Certainly, the disappearance and subsequent return of presidential candidate Ivan Rybkin (together with the three completely contradictory explanations of what happened to him) could not be considered intriguing. The winner is known and a portion of the electorate started to experience apathy.
Now the political situation has exploded, while all of the news programs have started to attract more of the public’s attention. The electorate is being asked to vote not only for the President but also for his new team; this can be seen as a sign of respect for the citizens.
Up until election day, March 14, all eyes will carefully follow the proceedings of the formation of the cabinet. This process will involve ratification in the Duma, and, finally, the personal appointment of the ministers.
But the media spotlight will, of course, be on Putin. There should be no worries about the last part of the campaign being saturated with news coverage. So the dismissal of the government was a very strong tactical move.
I assume that another reason for the dismissal of the government that is directly connected with the presidential election is that the government did enjoy some popularity, but it was significantly less than Putin’s (the lowest popularity rating in Russian politics is enjoyed by the Duma and the various political parties).
The dismissal of the government could increase Putin’s rating, though it is not clear why he would he need this – according to recent polls he is set to receive 70-80% of votes.
The question on everybody’s mind was “Who is going to replace Kasyanov?” I avoided making any forecasts since nobody has been able to predict any key appointments by Putin in the past.
It seemed to me that the best candidate for this position would have been Putin himself. The Constitution does not categorically preclude this option. This combination could unite the power of the presidency with the responsibilities of the head of the government as is already done in classic presidential republics such as the United States. Such a move could certainly speed up the reforms.
But the President once again surprised everyone, nominating Mikhail Fradkov for the job. Putin followed his own criteria, and he mentioned professionalism, honesty, and broadbased experience.
Fradkov is definitely experienced. He is a smart economist and was in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, an area where Putin previously had responsibility as vice-governor of St. Petersburg.
Fradkov knows the force-wielding structures since he worked in the Security Council and headed the tax police. And he knows the world as he is now moving to Moscow from Brussels, where he was Russia’s ambassador to the EU.
On March 5 the Duma will approve his nomination. On March 14 Putin will win the election
RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.5, February 2004
FOREIGN POLICY IN PUTIN’S SECOND TERM
When asked to comment on how the presidential election will impact Putin’s foreign policy during his second term as president, I was at a bit of a loss. International relations are playing no role whatsoever in the campaign, which, like the Duma races last fall, is utterly issueless. In general, only events on the scale of bombings of Belgrade or Baghdad can turn Russian public opinion to the outside world.
Nothing like this is going on, and Putin does not have to show any particular toughness or softness to achieve a landslide victory. Popular support for the president is running very high, and one can hardly say that his re-election would fundamentally augment his legitimacy and that this could serve as the basis for a new political direction.
Continuity will be the hallmark of the administration’s foreign policy. I have said more than once that Putin is a conservative, a Gaullist. Proceeding from his ideology, he will continue the independent, activist, multifaceted policy of a pragmatic father of his country, concerned with the greatness of the nation.
Considering Russia’s weakness to be the main threat to its security, Putin views foreign policy first and foremost as a means to effect conditions favorable to economic growth. Without a long-term international strategy for the country, which has still not entirely forged its new identity, policy will be largely reactive.
The novelty of the current situation lies in the obsoleteness of the old 1990s dichotomy—liberalism versus communism. It appears that this is gone for good, since both the Communist Party and the liberals from the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko are now embracing an utterly suicidal tactic that will lead very soon to their complete disappearance from the Russian political arena. But that is another story. The bottom line is that notions of Russia becoming part of the West by next Thursday or reverting to confrontation with the West are now things of the past and forever will be so.
The president is now surrounded by two dominant groups, each with its own approach to foreign policy. First, the integrationists—the economic part of the administration, the “Family”, oligarchs, etc.—advocate the maximum possible Russian participation in the world’s basic integrationist institutions.
Second, the neo-isolationists, basically representing the power wing of the administration, argue that a Russian path to growth, with emphasis on our own strength and a zone of national interests without a Western presence, is preferable. Neither group has a decisive advantage, and the balance of power in the Kremlin will continue into the future.
Yet it is important to stress that Putin is a more pro-Western and democratic politician than the overwhelming majority of the elite, not to mention the populace. He is leading Russia along a path of integration and will continue to do so, giving the unavoidable rhetoric of a Russian “special path” its due. And considering the natural limitations that are the principal obstacle to Russia’s entry into the main European and trans-Atlantic structures—the European Union and NATO— far from everything depends on us.
It is probably premature to look ahead to Russian-American relations in November 2004, but they promise to be anything but simple. In the American elections, the Democrats are taking an interest in exactly what it was that George W. Bush saw in Putin’s eyes, and the American president will have to show that he is far from completely agreeing with his Russian colleague.
Putin sees no problem with Russia’s democratic society, and he will not take any criticism of human rights. The development of Russian democracy will not correspond to many American conceptions about this process. Mikhail Khodorkovsky stands a good chance of serving the full prison sentence allowed by law—ten years. Russia will get bad press.
Without fail, Putin will view the Commonwealth of Independent States just like before, as a zone of special Russian interests and will be unhappy with any American activity there. For its part, the US does not see why its behavior in the post-Soviet space should be any different from anywhere else on the planet and is thus inclined to ignore Russian concerns.
As long as the Russian elite does not get an answer as to what concretely it will get from a tighter partnership with the United States, or does not provide an answer for itself, there will be no particular inclination to pursue such a partnership.
Europe is becoming an increasingly complex and tangled-up entity, with which it will not be easy to have relations. Beyond that. the EU is preoccupied more and more with its own problems of slowed economic growth, escalating internal tensions, and absorption of new countries that are essentially unprepared for membership and exhibit nationalistic inclinations (and the majority are anti-Russian).
Europe will be more egoistic, and Russia will face long and tedious negotiations over admission to the World Trade Organization, antidumping procedures, freedom of movement across borders for Russians, transit to Kaliningrad, etc.
Moscow is on the verge of making historic decisions that could lead either to long-term close strategic partnership with China or to deep strain on the bilateral relationship. At issue are plans to build an oil pipeline from northern Siberia; the choice is between a terminus at Datsin in China or at the Russian port of Nakhodka on the Pacific for ultimate delivery to Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the US. Delay of a final decision has greatly irritated the Chinese government, which will wait only until spring, at the latest.
Putin understands the potential downside of focusing on a single consumer market in Asia, especially since the main lobbyist for the Chinese route, Yukos, has fallen out of favor. I think that Moscow will make an effort to find new oil reserves so as to supply both pipelines from the outset and, with that in mind, will take advantage of Japanese proposals for large-scale investment in oil-drilling in Siberia. Cooperation on energy promises to extricate Russian-Japanese relations from their current dead end.
Thus, Putin’s second term will be a continuation of the first. It will be a time to work out a long-term strategy for Russia and at least a preliminary answer to the question “Where do we belong?” For now, the only indicator of any change is the appointment of Konstantin Kosachev as chair of the Duma committee on international affairs. He is a career diplomat and a man more pro-Western and less nationalistic than his predecessor, Dmitri Rogozin.
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