Информация о Фонде

Trud, No. 72, April 19, 2003

WHAT WILL RUSSIA DO IF THE USA PRESSURISES SYRIA?

April 10, 2003

Looking Ahead: Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

There is less than one week remaining until the Duma elections. It seems the electoral campaign, which was short-changed by new election legislation, was unable to make substantial changes in the balance of power among the main political parties. However, public opinion polls conducted by Russia’s leading polling agencies (the Public Opinion Foundation, VTsIOM, VTsIOM-A, ROMIR), for all their differences, identify identical trends. They are as follows.

United Russia is energetically pulling ahead of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), which was in the lead not long ago but whose rating is now dwindling before our eyes. Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party is running in place with a showing of just over five percent (6-9%). Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly Chubais’ Union of Right Forces (SPS) is slowly but surely catching up to the LDPR, clearing the danger zone. Yabloko hit a snag, and now not all polls show that it will make it into the Duma. And last, everyone is noticing the steady rise of the Motherland bloc, led by Sergei Glaziev and Dmitry Rogozin, who are finishing very energetically, already near the cherished five-percent bar.

What happened in less than a month of campaigning that changed the electoral landscape? Why have some gained and others fallen behind?

I am inclined to attribute United Russia’s successes to the fact that on the eve of the elections not only have the leaderships of the Unity and Fatherland-All-Russia blocs merged but so have their electorates. The two blocs competed separately in 1999, and when these rivals from the last Duma election formed a unified party two years ago, not all of their voters accepted this. Defying the laws of arithmetic, 1 + 1 did not equal two in public opinion polls but more like one. Now, looking at all the alternatives, it seems that voters are returning to their preferences of four years ago. What’s more is that the same row of faces is looking down at them from the billboards – Boris Gryzlov and Sergei Shoigu, formerly of Unity, and Yury Luzhkov with Mintimer Shaimiev from Fatherland-All-Russia. The parties have also stuck together in the voters’ consciousness (1 + 1 = 2), which promises United Russia up to a third of votes.

Also to United Russia’s advantage is the fact that Vladimir Putin, having given his support to the party, has given no hints whatsoever that he is sympathetic to any other political force. The President’s high level of popularity was reflected back onto United Russia. Tough measures taken recently by the Administration – from the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky to the unceasing detainment of corrupt police and provincial bureaucrats – have yielded the party electoral benefit. The voters, unlike most of the press, appreciated all these moves.

Paradoxically, United Russia won because of its formal non-participation in the television debates. Sparing itself from the requisite discussions with small parties about the country’s development problems (and, given the format, it would have been impossible to avoid these discussions since lots were drawn to determine who would face off in the debates), United Russia was at the same time widely shown in media programs. So it is not an accident that, when asked which of the parties performed best in the debates, the majority said United Russia, which didn’t even participate.

In my view, the Communist Party’s decline can be explained by major strategic miscalculations by the party’s leadership. One gets the feeling that Gennady Zyuganov and his closest colleagues did not expect to be the Kremlin’s main target during the 2003 campaign, even though this was easy to predict given that the KPRF was the “party of power’s” strongest challenger. If the party’s leaders had perceived what the campaign had in store for them, they would not have included in its list more than a couple dozen leaders and representatives of financial-industrial groups, would not have been in contact with disgraced oligarch and national irritant Boris Berezovsky, would not have protected Khodorkovsky, and KPRF bankroller Vidmanov would not have straightened out the records of his offshore accounts in Cyprus. The Communist leaders were not prepared for the allegations of corruption and responded to them with pathetic excuses and counteraccusations about dishonest campaign tactics, which voters always interpret as a sign of weakness. The party lost its image as a rock-hard fighter for social justice. Bereft of any new ideas, the KPRF opted for its usual struggle against the government’s policies, which is perceived as a struggle against Putin, who is actually quite popular with a significant part of the Communists’ electorate. I would be very surprised if the KPRF gets more than 20% of the vote.

Zhirinovsky’s LDPR is a one-man show. This year he needs to be even more brutal than usual (picking fist fights on the air, making boorish comments, and promising to put the entire establishment in jail) in order to keep attention focused on him somehow. For now this is succeeding and Zhirinovsky has a chance to come in third place, especially since polls usually underestimate his support – people don’t always admit to interviewers that their sympathies lie with the LDPR.

As I see it, the Union of Right Forces is getting votes on account of Anatoly Chubais. He is as hated by the majority of the population as he is adored by the liberal electorate, especially when is in good form on television. Boris Nemtsov, Irina Khakamada, and the other well-known SPS personalities are not doing a bad job either. The party benefited from proposing a merger with Yabloko to form a democratic coalition and has consistently defended Mikhail Khodorkovsky, for whom there is considerable sympathy among the right wing.

It looks as if the Khodorkovsky affair has backfired on Yabloko. It is not that Yukos was the party’s main sponsor but that Grigory Yavlinsky had built his campaign on criticism of Russia’s “oligarchic capitalism.” After this, his defense of the oligarch Khodorkovsky clashed with his original political stance. Besides that, his refusal to join forces with SPS was received badly. As a result, liberal voters have moved towards Chubais and Nemtsov while opponents of “oligarchic capitalism” have gravitated towards Motherland, which has been far more forceful in formulating its stance on the issue. Nevertheless, Yavlinsky holds a trump card – President Putin’s personal fondness for him.

The growth in Glaziev’s and Rogozin’s ratings can be explained, first of all, by the fact that they are just about the only ones with a concrete idea. This is the concept of “natural rents,” the notion that oil and gas companies should contribute to the budget far more than they do at present and that they can afford to do this. While all the parties in the race, including SPS and Yabloko, agree with this, authorship rests with Glaziev. Second, Motherland has found a niche – moderately nationalistic – filled in previous elections by a number of small parties that have now been crowded out of the electoral field. Third, after their other party initiatives – Gennady Raikov’s People’s Party, the Speakers’ Bloc of Sergei Mironov and Gennady Seleznev – showed their lack of promise, the Petersburg “Siloviki” put their resources behind Motherland. The final reason is the success of the “family unit” tactic to dilute the Communist electorate; many disillusioned Communists are defecting to Motherland.

There is one more party that is benefiting from the dissolution of the Communists’ support. In the last week, the Pensioners’ Party-Party of Social Justice bloc has appeared on public opinion radar screens, sharply criticizing the KPRF for its betrayal of real communist ideals. If anyone is still capable of pulling off a surprise, this is the only bloc that can.

There won’t be any other surprises. United Russia will win, which, added to a large chunk of single-mandate deputies, will provide a stable pro-Putin majority. Whether there will be five parties in the Duma or six is a question that will be decided on election day by fractions of a percentage point.

The Duma electoral campaign, barely noticeable to begin with, has now gotten completely lost in the furor over of the Yukos affair. The arrest of the company’s head, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, along with the freezing of its shares, has already prompted a chorus of commentaries about the possible consequences for Russia.

On the economic front, few experts doubt that they are very bad: the stock market is already convulsing, a growing amount of capital is flowing out of the country, and Russia is becoming less attractive to investors.

There are far fewer voices on the political front, where evaluations of the consequences boil down to predictions of whether Aleksandr Voloshin would resign as head of the presidential administration and debates over popular support for the arrest of the oligarchs.

I will hazard to suggest that the political ripples of all these events will widen significantly to influence the upcoming elections. Keep in mind that we are talking about the biggest scandal of Putin’s first term and possibly the biggest political crisis of his nearly crisis-free presidency.

Voloshin’s resignation represents the obvious aging of the Kremlin clan referred to as “the old Yeltsinites” or “the Family,” which is to the advantage of the Petersburg Siloviki.

According to the division of labor within the Administration, elections have been traditionally delegated to the Family, who have proven to be highly effective political managers.

The resignation of Voloshin on the eve of elections for Duma deputies and president obviously will not strengthen the Administration on the electoral front, and so Putin, having allowed the head of his staff to leave, has preserved the rest of his team if only for the time being. Nevertheless, Voloshin’s departure will inevitably change the nature of the Kremlin’s relations with other political players.

The Family was associated with a certain political course (or political style), dubbed “managed democracy” by sharper tongues, which is based on administrative and informational domination in the elections and on tough (but outwardly democratic) methods of marshaling support for the president in the Duma and the regions.

It is not out of the question that Voloshin’s departure will mark the beginning of the end of “managed democracy,” which in theory could be replaced either by real democracy or by “managed non-democracy.” I would say the chances of the latter are higher, though I am almost certain that Putin will try to preserve a balance of power in the Kremlin and will not want to rely on only one group — the Siloviki — as this would alienate all the other groups and dangerously limit his power base among the elite.

Although the electorate’s reaction to recent events hasn’t been precisely gauged yet, such information will not be very telling — public opinion usually doesn’t notice even serious shifts of this sort. Generally speaking, in light of the public’s aversion to big business, one has to agree that the Yukos affair won’t do the Administration much harm. But it will still create some problems, it would appear.

In the “Putin coalition” — that bloc of voters who are ready to vote for the President — there is one significant social stratum that does not harbor prejudice against private enterprise and does not support suppressive measures against it. This is the youth. If Putin wants to win in a single round next March, he cannot allow himself to lose the support of this group.

It is entirely likely that the noise surrounding the Khodorkovsky affair can also rouse a “sleeping dog”— the middle class of small business owners who, though not too politically active thus far, now recognize that they have something to lose.

These sentiments are already clearly visible at least in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where people regularly read the newspapers. It should also be noted that a majority of the print media is noticeably dramatizing all these events as something like a return to the Stalin era and sympathize more with Khodorkovsky than with the General Prosecutor.

The very liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy posed the following question to its audience: If the presidential elections were held this Sunday, whom would you vote for — Putin or Khodorkovsky? A record number of listeners phoned in their answers, and Khodorkovsky won by a ratio of 75 to 25. Thus I foresee higher than usual voter turnout among the prosperous middle class that traditionally does not vote. This will be good news for Yabloko, SPS, and the “against all” option on the ballot more than for the party of power.

Another difficulty for the government is the timing of the Yukos events, which coincide with the official start of campaigning in the mass media. On November 7 candidates from the registered parties will begin to appear on television screens daily, often live, and there may be more criticism of the government’s actions than many in the Kremlin expected. Since Yukos had supporters (and not always disinterested ones) in many segments of the political spectrum, this criticism will come from both the right and the left.

In conclusion, the Yukos affair’s consequences for the elections aren’t vast, but they are there, mainly in the form of difficulties for the Kremlin as well as for Putin personally.

Trud, June 23, 2003
WHAT ON EARTH IS GOING ON IN RUSSIA?
Vyacheslav NIKONOV, president of the Politika Foundation

A foreign correspondent whom I know rather well called me the other day, asking anxiously whether great political upheavals lie in store for Russia today.

That was followed by listing the developments which he could not account for. The liberal Yabloko party joins hands with the communists and even with Zhirinovsky's LDPR in a vote on no confidence in the cabinet appointed by Vladimir Putin. The media, prompted by a group of well-known political analysts, discuss in earnest an alleged prospect of an oligarchic coup against the president. St. Petersburg, the second largest city in Russia, remains to be without a governor, who was urgently summoned to Moscow and given a post of deputy prime minister. It is very rarely that governors were called to Moscow before the end of their term of office.

I tried to calm down the foreign observer of developments in this country. These developments have a quite peaceful explanation. All significant events that are taking place and will take place on Russia's political scene this year will almost entirely be associated with the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, and election of regional authorities.

The proposed vote of no confidence in the government is most directly associated with the election campaign. Only naive people can think that Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky and Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov really tried to bring about the cabinet's resignation. According to the Constitution, to send the government packing, the State Duma is to vote by a simple majority for its resignation twice, and the opposition has only one-third of the seats in the State Duma. After which the president has to dissolve either the cabinet or the Duma. Even if we imagine the impossible - that no confidence is voted for twice in parliament - it is unlikely that Putin will find communist arguments more convincing than the results of the cabinet's work. The results are not too impressive, but Russia is now among the five countries with the highest rate of economic development.

Behind the no-confidence vote is a clear calculation by the political technologists of the left- and right-wing opposition. They are not stupid people - they conduct their own public opinion studies and produce recommendations for their party leaderships. In recent months they recommended, first, to consolidate their electorate, which is mainly displeased with the present conditions of their life, and remind the electorate that it has not displayed its opposition attitudes for too long. It is really difficult to expect a spontaneous demonstration of opposition from the Communist Party and Yabloko - they are far from poor people and most of them are quite satisfied with their own life. Second, the consultants of the opposition are alarmed by the growing capabilities of United Russia and suggest leaving that pro-presidential party no chance to win over additional votes by feigning mild dissatisfaction with the cabinet. Having used the tactics of forestalling criticism, the Communist Party and Yabloko, and also Zhirinovsky who joined them at the last moment, may boast successful completion of one action in the election campaign.

The sally against the oligarchs is a bit more complicated game with many moves in, but it has an impressive component of the election campaign. The point is that some financial and industrial groups have become too active sponsors of various political forces, including those that clearly belong to the opposition, which alarmed both rivals and influential groups in and near the Kremlin. The present attack on the oligarchs is meant as a stern warning to the biggest businessmen that they should be more discriminating in their political preferences and tone down their ardor in the election campaign.

And the transfer of Vladimir Yakovlev from St. Petersburg to Moscow is nothing but setting the stage for the forthcoming gubernatorial elections in St. Petersburg, the hometown of the president. In recent years many people in the Kremlin considered Yakovlev to be the very Carthage that must inevitably be destroyed. Back in 1996, Yakovlev, then the first vice mayor of St. Petersburg, left the team of the then mayor Anatoly Sobchak and outstripped him in the election race. The loud scandals around Yakovlev's alleged ties with the Mafia and his improper spending of the budget money were used merely as additional arguments for making claims to him by the present presidential team. Not long ago Yakovlev was deprived of a possibility of running for another term, and then the stage was cleared for another candidate (Valentina Matviyenko is named most often as a possible one), so that the ex-governor and his team could not greatly influence the elections. And the post of vice prime minister for housing, municipal service and roads is not a place where one can display great achievements and retain this post for long. However, I would like to be mistaken here.

I was in the USA when the Iraqi war ended. Meeting with dozens of experts, journalists and politicians, taking part in conferences and watching the round-the-clock media coverage of the situation, I tried, above all, to determine what damage the war did to the Russia-US partnership. Relations with the USA, the world's only superpower, are extremely important to any country, including Russia.

My first impressions and feelings were not optimistic. Russia has greatly surprised the USA, where nobody expected it to take such a harsh anti-American stand. The fact that Moscow sometimes spoke even harsher than the Arab countries did was duly noted. Those in the US Administration and academic circles who were sympathetic to Russia were criticised and pushed back for failure to predict that Russia would stand by Saddam Hussein to the last. They could not forecast our logic, which seemed utterly unreasonable.

But the hawks, who had initially denounced rapprochement with Russia as a gross mistake of George Bush, were happy. What else could you expect from Russians? they seemed to say. The developments of the past few weeks engendered more problems. Information about alleged Russian arms deliveries to Iraq was consonant with Russia's violation of the UN Security Council's sanctions against Iraq, which Russia had supported.

In general, Russia was mentioned on television, if at all, along with France and Syria, which the Americans saw as the allies of Saddam Hussein. Germany has been "forgiven" but negative feelings for France have been growing. On the list of most hateful politicians, Jacques Chirac was put only slightly below Saddam Hussein. And the invitation of the French President to St. Petersburg did not add sympathy for Russia.

Both analysts and the general public were shocked by the multi-thousand anti-war meeting at the US Embassy in Moscow at a time when all television channels were showing US troops in Baghdad and crowds of cheering Iraqis. The impression was that Moscow was situated on some other planet.

By and large, there were reasons to doubt that the Russia-US partnership had a future. But the more I talked with Americans, read newspapers and watched television, the more I thought that not everything was lost yet.

Happily, there was little information from Russia because France took the main blow. I noticed that "negative" information about Russia was not repeated by one television channel or newspaper after another. It appeared that Washington was deliberately let drop the shows that could potentially explode Russia-US relationship. I believe the reason is that the improvement of relations with Russia was proclaimed by President Bush two years ago as a US foreign policy priority. The White House is not in a hurry to denounce this line as wrong, as this would redirect the blow at the Chief Executive.

The opposition, though it is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Moscow, does not dare yet criticise President Bush, who is extremely popular in the country now. The statement of Vladimir Putin, who said that Russia did not wish defeat to the USA, had a positive effect and greatly softened the tone of commentaries in the USA.

I am convinced that Bush will attend the celebrations of the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg, unless something extraordinary happens. The warming of bilateral relations, which Russia needs no less than the USA does, is possible. But I do not think they will soon become as warm as they were in 2001-02. Neither do I think that Russia has a good chance of preserving its positions in post-Saddam Iraq.

There will be many more trials. I hope to God that the "trial by Iraq" is over and no fresh proof of our military collaboration with the defeated regime will be found there. But we are facing a trial by Syria. It does not look as if the Americans plan to use force there, but they will use the threat of force to demand the liquidation of Hezbollah-type organisations there. How will Russia react to such a demand?

Q: The conflict in Iraq has led to a cooling off in relations between Russia and the US. Where do you see the relationship going?

I would hope that this is a temporary phenomenon, and that the current increase in tension between Russia and the US will not last, that disagreements over Iraq will not become a start-off point for more confrontation, but on the contrary, an episode that will lead to rapprochement. Although it's difficult for me to say if that's how things will develop. Soon the election campaigns are starting in Russia, and there is a danger that anti-American sentiment will be exploited and become institutionalized as a result of the elections. That would be bad.

On the other hand, Russian foreign policy depends on the president, who doesn't check to see what the Duma and the Federation Council are doing at every moment. To a great extent, the future of Russian-American relations will depend on the president's position, even though he's not 100% free to do as he wishes. When Putin sought to align with the US after 9/11, he was definitely marching ahead of 90% of the Russian political elite, which is tainted with anti-Americanism.

Q: Some leaders of former Soviet republics supported the US. Has this affected their relations with Russia?

It wouldn't be wise to scold your allies or former allies for having a sovereign foreign policy. In any case this behavior was pragmatic. There was a conflict in Georgia, over American recon planes that flew too close to Russia, which made some people in Moscow nervous. But it wasn't directly related to the Georgian stance on Iraq.

Q: What Russian interests, if any, can Moscow expect to maintain once the war is over?

I think there's no perspective for that. Russia had one serious trump card, which is could have used to guarantee its interests in a post-Saddam Iraq - the Security Council vote. But after that failed, Russia was left holding all the cards. Which is a shame.

Russia had considered the war prima facie illegal, and did not see a possibility to bargain over Russian support for the operation. As the Foreign Ministry is trying to prove, Russian contracts in Iraq were legitimate, and should be honored after the war. Here we can expect some disappointment, which could be another basis for dissatisfaction with America and a worsening in relations. Although, in my opinion, Russia could have behaved in a much more pragmatic manner. I greatly admire the Chinese stance - they didn't back away from their principles, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the US position, but they didn't sour relations with America.

Q: What has been the Russian response to the appearance of American bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia?

There's not a single response to anything in Russia. For many in the foreign policy establishment in Russia, it was a threat. Those who supported cooperation with the US said: thank God the Americans have destroyed the Taliban, because we were speculating about a war with them just a couple years ago. Now the problem has disappeared, the Americans took care of it. The opponents argued that there was nothing positive about that, because it weakened the Central Asian governments' dependency on Russia. The Talibs had Uzbekistan by the collar, so it went along Russia. Not this pressure is gone, Americans have fortified themselves in Central Asia, which is a threat to Russian national interests.

My view is that US presence in Central Asia weakens Russian influence - including in a number of practical issues, having to do with transport corridors, energy transport etc. On the other hand, Americans stabilized the region and gave some regional governments to reap the benefits of globalization, which is a rather good thing. Moreover, if Russia had served as the defender of Western civilization against the East, as many think, then now the US has taken up the task, which should be welcomed.

There are discussions among the politicians of what is the greatest threat to Russia. One faction thinks the main threat is from the south, the "belt of instability" from the Balkans to China. That's the source of terrorist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Another faction thinks the US is the greatest threat. Therefore, the south presents an opposition - and possibly even a counterbalance - to the United States. This is where the wide-spread sympathy for the Iraqis come from. Iraqis were being perceived, often justly, as victims of aggression. Anti-American sentiment swells up during US military actions.

Naturally, for those who consider America the main threat, the south is just a peripheral problem. And for those who view the south as the main problem, they formulate policy to prevent threats to Russian security from that region.

Q: Russia is trying to pacify Chechnya, while the US is undertaking similar actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Is there a workable mechanism for solving these kinds of problems?

Of course not, or else these kinds of problems would not arise. There are approximately 40 countries in the world today that have a problem with separatism and continuing military actions. These conflicts, especially if they are steeped in ethnic or religious animosity, can last decades, even centuries. There are no solutions for them. We can see this clearly in the example of Great Britain, which still cannot rid itself of the Northern Ireland problem. Chechnya is another old wound, one that has been bleeding for almost 200 years with no end in sight. Of course, political rapprochement is possible, and so is the creation of a power structure deemed legitimate by the Chechen population, one that can be negotiated with. But this doesn't mean that incursions by groups of warriors would cease. Those can go on for many more years.

In Afghanistan, the US did not propose to create an exemplary democratic government. It's likely such a thing is impossible, in a society that's not yet even fully feudal. They had very limited goals: to destroy the Taliban, to take control of Kabul, ad to give a free hand to the regional commanders, who became the rulers of various provinces.

In Iraq, everything will be different. This is an organized society that can create an effective center of power. I don't believe in an Islamic democracy, much less an Arab democracy, but the pre-conditions for a more-or-less normal society do exist there. And so is the potential for economic growth, in the form of oil. Iraq has more of it than Russia.

Things never settle. The world society is always developing. Russia will likely become an independent center of power. It is, for the most part, not integrated into the European structures. It's hard to imagine Russia as a significant member of NATO or the EU. In the East, there is nothing to integrate into. So Russia, in view of its size and internal peculiarities, is fated to become an independent and autonomous center of power.

Regarding the global system, it will oscillate from a unipolar domination by the US to a multipolar world. The US will try to show that they can do everything everywhere, but this will not turn out to be the case. In one of my articles I characterized the 21st century system as a return to the "balance of powers" system at the end of the 19th century, only on a global scale.

Yes, the US has an advantage in a number of parameters, but this domination is nothing exceptional. The American economy was a larger fraction of the world economy in 1945. China's role in the world economy of the 17^th century was greater than America's role today. There will be a certain balance of power, and I cannot imagine the possibility of a war between the great powers, if only because they all have nuclear capability. Regarding the conflicts on the periphery, they will persist. Just like in the 19^th century, when the great powers almost never fought among themselves, but maintained an active foreign policy. This system is fairly stable; in any case, during the time of the "balance of power" in late 19th-early 20^th century, Europe enjoyed a period of peace.

Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 49, March 21, 2003
POSSIBLE EFFECT OF MILITARY OPERATION IN IRAQ ON RUSSIA-U.S. RELATIONS

1. As regards lawfulness of the use of force against Iraq in terms of international law, do the U.S. actions in defiance of an impressive part of the world community spell an end for international institutions like, say, the UN?

2. What will be the effect of the situation around Iraq on Russia in general and on U.S.-Russia relations in particular?

1. The consequences for international law will be bad, of course. Though, perhaps, we should not exaggerate here - international law has been a victim of all armed conflicts over the past half a century. You must admit that very rarely military operations are conducted in conformity with international law and UN sanctions. Today, too, we are witnessing yet another instance of its violation.

2. The war in Iraq is not our war. Therefore any developments in Iraq would spell certain losses for Russia. At present, in my view, Vladimir Putin has largely ensured support for Russia's course, especially in the Muslim countries. At the same time Russia's positions in Iraq have obviously suffered. I do not think that in post-Saddam Iraq we will have any possibility to influence the situation in that country. And, of course, definite damage will be done to Russia-U.S. relations.

Moscow Times, March 6, 2003
How to Avoid Losing the War in Iraq
Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the Fond Politika think tank, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.

The invasion of Iraq led by the United States and Britain -- expected any day now -- is not going to be a "Russian war." The view of the public and the political elite in this country is that such a war is not justified either from a legal or moral standpoint.

Russia is perfectly happy with the status quo, both for the reasons officially stated (the dangerous precedent of unilateral military action undertaken without UN Security Council authorization, and the loss of trade and economic links with Baghdad) as well as for reasons less openly expressed. Russia is quite content with the existing sanctions regime, which prevents the unfettered flow of Iraqi oil onto the world market and the attendant depression of world oil prices.

However, the time has come to make serious decisions based on an understanding of the indisputable fact that war is inevitable, as is the downfall of Saddam Hussein.

Thank goodness President Vladimir Putin, while coming out in favor of a peaceful solution to the conflict, has nonetheless kept all his options open and has managed not to damage relations with any major world leader.

The mood prevailing among the political class is very similar to the mood that reigned during NATO's operation in Kosovo. Back then, the country's entire diplomatic capital was expended on "anti-Americanism" and defending Slobodan Milosevich -- with the result that Russia's influence in that part of the world fell to zero.

However, while support for Milosevich then can be explained (the fraternal feelings between Russians and Serbs, historical opposition to Islamic expansion in the Balkans, etc.), the sympathies many of our politicians, including the Communists, profess for Hussein is rather mysterious. It is no secret that the Iraqi dictator butchered his own communists at the start of his reign. Kurds and Iranians -- friends of the Soviet Union and Russia -- were murdered by the tens of thousands using, among other things, mustard and nerve gas. Hussein has not repaid his outstanding debts to us, and not because he could not -- debts to the French and Germans have been serviced meticulously. And even perched on the brink of war, Hussein could not find any better way to express his gratitude to Russia for its support than to announce that Iraq is breaking off its West Qurna oil field contract with LUKoil, Mashinoimport and Zarubezhneft. Moreover, these companies were punished only because they did not stray outside the constraints set by UN sanctions.

Many well-informed experts and politicians consider it essential to use all means to oppose the United States -- if for nothing else than to form an alliance of nations to counter unipolarity and preserve the existing system of international law. While these goals may well be noble, they cannot be achieved in the immediate future.

As events in recent weeks have demonstrated, there are no major states today that are prepared to commit themselves firmly to anti-American policies. Germany and France, due to the political balance of forces domestically, are capable of defying Washington on certain issues for a short period of time, but they will nonetheless remain allies of the United States. Saving face and restoring good relations with the United States are no less a concern than saving Iraq. Those Russian politicians and experts who assume that in the foreseeable future an alliance with Moscow -- and moreover on an anti-American platform -- is going to be more attractive than an alliance with the United States display breathtaking naivete.

Our Chinese counterparts are already surprised at the toughness of the Russian position vis-a-vis Iraq. For Beijing, it is much more important not to damage trade relations with the United States (trade volumes between China and Russia are one-tenth of those between China and the United States) than to defend Iraq, where China does not have any particular interests.

I very much doubt that France or China will veto a U.S.-British UN resolution. Russia may find itself in the role of lone defender of Hussein's regime. To play this role would mean to relinquish all influence whatsoever over subsequent events, as well as the possibility of protecting Russia's national interests in a post-Hussein Iraq.

And we are unlikely to save the international legal system -- in fact, truth be told, there is not much to save at this point. In the past half-century, there have been many wars around the world, but with the minor exceptions of sending an army into Korea in the 1950s and the use of force against Hussein in the first Gulf War, they did not have UN authorization. The Soviet Union occupied Kabul, NATO bombed Belgrade etc. without paying much attention to the UN Security Council. That's not to say that UN Security Council authorization is not at the center of the international legal system. But it may prove impossible to assert the dictatorship of law and universal justice on a global scale in the coming days.

Furthermore, there are other priorities that can be defended and should not fall victim to anti-American sentiments:

First is the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hussein has for some time possessed chemical and biological (but not nuclear) weapons in ample quantities. And there are no grounds to believe that over the past four years, having kicked out UN inspectors, he has been actively engaged in secretly destroying his cache.

Second is the war against international terrorism and Islamic extremism. Hussein openly sponsors, for example, Palestinian terrorists.

Third is the maintenance of good relations with the world's leading powers, including the United States.

Finally, surely a major priority is the preservation -- as far as is possible -- of Russia's commercial interests in Iraq after the war. If we do not reach an agreement with the United States now about the rules of the game after the war, we will lose our commercial presence altogether.

Moreover, time is not on our side. When the first U.S. rocket hits Iraqi soil, Russia's negotiating position will also take a major hit.

First and foremost, it is not in Russia's interest to undertake any actions at the UN Security Council that could marginalize Russia and keep it from participating in major issues of international politics.

Russia needs to maintain a permanent dialogue with all the major players in the Iraq crisis -- not only with those opposed to military action, but also with the future victors. It is clear that Russia will not be able to retain its position in Iraq completely intact -- losses are inevitable and we should not have any illusions on this count, but every effort must be made to minimize losses.

If Russia cannot preserve all its contracts with Iraq it must attempt to save the most important ones, in particular the oil contracts. Talks are no guarantee of success, but without them Russia will surely get nothing.

Upgrading the level of negotiators on the Russian side may improve the chances of reaching an acceptable agreement (certain issues can only be decided by the highest echelon of state officials), as would the precise formulation of Russia's position -- i.e. what specifically Russia wants to stake a claim on in postwar Iraq and on what conditions. No one else is going to help Russia formulate its national interests, or assist in realizing these interests.

Russia is not capable of preventing a war. But it is still capable of not losing out in the war.

			Publications
		"POLITY" Foundation Vyacheslav Nikonov
		RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Desember 2003 In the Home Stretch RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.2, November 2003 YUKOS AND THE ELECTIONS November, 2003 Planet Earth: Russia and Transatlantic Relations «Russia in Global Affairs», September 3, 2003. Temptation of Uniqueness Trud, June 23, 2003 WHAT ON EARTH IS GOING ON IN RUSSIA? Trud, No. 72, April 19, 2003 WHAT WILL RUSSIA DO IF THE USA PRESSURISES SYRIA? April 10, 2003 Looking Ahead: Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 49, March 21, 2003 POSSIBLE EFFECT OF MILITARY OPERATION IN IRAQ ON RUSSIA-U.S. RELATIONS Moscow Times, March 6, 2003 How to Avoid Losing the War in Iraq RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Desember 2003 In the Home Stretch There is less than one week remaining until the Duma elections. It seems the electoral campaign, which was short-changed by new election legislation, was unable to make substantial changes in the balance of power among the main political parties. However, public opinion polls conducted by Russia’s leading polling agencies (the Public Opinion Foundation, VTsIOM, VTsIOM-A, ROMIR), for all their differences, identify identical trends. They are as follows. United Russia is energetically pulling ahead of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), which was in the lead not long ago but whose rating is now dwindling before our eyes. Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party is running in place with a showing of just over five percent (6-9%). Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly Chubais’ Union of Right Forces (SPS) is slowly but surely catching up to the LDPR, clearing the danger zone. Yabloko hit a snag, and now not all polls show that it will make it into the Duma. And last, everyone is noticing the steady rise of the Motherland bloc, led by Sergei Glaziev and Dmitry Rogozin, who are finishing very energetically, already near the cherished five-percent bar. What happened in less than a month of campaigning that changed the electoral landscape? Why have some gained and others fallen behind? I am inclined to attribute United Russia’s successes to the fact that on the eve of the elections not only have the leaderships of the Unity and Fatherland-All-Russia blocs merged but so have their electorates. The two blocs competed separately in 1999, and when these rivals from the last Duma election formed a unified party two years ago, not all of their voters accepted this. Defying the laws of arithmetic, 1 + 1 did not equal two in public opinion polls but more like one. Now, looking at all the alternatives, it seems that voters are returning to their preferences of four years ago. What’s more is that the same row of faces is looking down at them from the billboards – Boris Gryzlov and Sergei Shoigu, formerly of Unity, and Yury Luzhkov with Mintimer Shaimiev from Fatherland-All-Russia. The parties have also stuck together in the voters’ consciousness (1 + 1 = 2), which promises United Russia up to a third of votes. Also to United Russia’s advantage is the fact that Vladimir Putin, having given his support to the party, has given no hints whatsoever that he is sympathetic to any other political force. The President’s high level of popularity was reflected back onto United Russia. Tough measures taken recently by the Administration – from the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky to the unceasing detainment of corrupt police and provincial bureaucrats – have yielded the party electoral benefit. The voters, unlike most of the press, appreciated all these moves. Paradoxically, United Russia won because of its formal non-participation in the television debates. Sparing itself from the requisite discussions with small parties about the country’s development problems (and, given the format, it would have been impossible to avoid these discussions since lots were drawn to determine who would face off in the debates), United Russia was at the same time widely shown in media programs. So it is not an accident that, when asked which of the parties performed best in the debates, the majority said United Russia, which didn’t even participate. In my view, the Communist Party’s decline can be explained by major strategic miscalculations by the party’s leadership. One gets the feeling that Gennady Zyuganov and his closest colleagues did not expect to be the Kremlin’s main target during the 2003 campaign, even though this was easy to predict given that the KPRF was the “party of power’s” strongest challenger. If the party’s leaders had perceived what the campaign had in store for them, they would not have included in its list more than a couple dozen leaders and representatives of financial-industrial groups, would not have been in contact with disgraced oligarch and national irritant Boris Berezovsky, would not have protected Khodorkovsky, and KPRF bankroller Vidmanov would not have straightened out the records of his offshore accounts in Cyprus. The Communist leaders were not prepared for the allegations of corruption and responded to them with pathetic excuses and counteraccusations about dishonest campaign tactics, which voters always interpret as a sign of weakness. The party lost its image as a rock-hard fighter for social justice. Bereft of any new ideas, the KPRF opted for its usual struggle against the government’s policies, which is perceived as a struggle against Putin, who is actually quite popular with a significant part of the Communists’ electorate. I would be very surprised if the KPRF gets more than 20% of the vote. Zhirinovsky’s LDPR is a one-man show. This year he needs to be even more brutal than usual (picking fist fights on the air, making boorish comments, and promising to put the entire establishment in jail) in order to keep attention focused on him somehow. For now this is succeeding and Zhirinovsky has a chance to come in third place, especially since polls usually underestimate his support – people don’t always admit to interviewers that their sympathies lie with the LDPR. As I see it, the Union of Right Forces is getting votes on account of Anatoly Chubais. He is as hated by the majority of the population as he is adored by the liberal electorate, especially when is in good form on television. Boris Nemtsov, Irina Khakamada, and the other well-known SPS personalities are not doing a bad job either. The party benefited from proposing a merger with Yabloko to form a democratic coalition and has consistently defended Mikhail Khodorkovsky, for whom there is considerable sympathy among the right wing. It looks as if the Khodorkovsky affair has backfired on Yabloko. It is not that Yukos was the party’s main sponsor but that Grigory Yavlinsky had built his campaign on criticism of Russia’s “oligarchic capitalism.” After this, his defense of the oligarch Khodorkovsky clashed with his original political stance. Besides that, his refusal to join forces with SPS was received badly. As a result, liberal voters have moved towards Chubais and Nemtsov while opponents of “oligarchic capitalism” have gravitated towards Motherland, which has been far more forceful in formulating its stance on the issue. Nevertheless, Yavlinsky holds a trump card – President Putin’s personal fondness for him. The growth in Glaziev’s and Rogozin’s ratings can be explained, first of all, by the fact that they are just about the only ones with a concrete idea. This is the concept of “natural rents,” the notion that oil and gas companies should contribute to the budget far more than they do at present and that they can afford to do this. While all the parties in the race, including SPS and Yabloko, agree with this, authorship rests with Glaziev. Second, Motherland has found a niche – moderately nationalistic – filled in previous elections by a number of small parties that have now been crowded out of the electoral field. Third, after their other party initiatives – Gennady Raikov’s People’s Party, the Speakers’ Bloc of Sergei Mironov and Gennady Seleznev – showed their lack of promise, the Petersburg “Siloviki” put their resources behind Motherland. The final reason is the success of the “family unit” tactic to dilute the Communist electorate; many disillusioned Communists are defecting to Motherland. There is one more party that is benefiting from the dissolution of the Communists’ support. In the last week, the Pensioners’ Party-Party of Social Justice bloc has appeared on public opinion radar screens, sharply criticizing the KPRF for its betrayal of real communist ideals. If anyone is still capable of pulling off a surprise, this is the only bloc that can. There won’t be any other surprises. United Russia will win, which, added to a large chunk of single-mandate deputies, will provide a stable pro-Putin majority. Whether there will be five parties in the Duma or six is a question that will be decided on election day by fractions of a percentage point. There is not much longer to wait for the results. RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.2, November 2003 YUKOS AND THE ELECTIONS The Duma electoral campaign, barely noticeable to begin with, has now gotten completely lost in the furor over of the Yukos affair. The arrest of the company’s head, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, along with the freezing of its shares, has already prompted a chorus of commentaries about the possible consequences for Russia. On the economic front, few experts doubt that they are very bad: the stock market is already convulsing, a growing amount of capital is flowing out of the country, and Russia is becoming less attractive to investors. There are far fewer voices on the political front, where evaluations of the consequences boil down to predictions of whether Aleksandr Voloshin would resign as head of the presidential administration and debates over popular support for the arrest of the oligarchs. I will hazard to suggest that the political ripples of all these events will widen significantly to influence the upcoming elections. Keep in mind that we are talking about the biggest scandal of Putin’s first term and possibly the biggest political crisis of his nearly crisis-free presidency. Voloshin’s resignation represents the obvious aging of the Kremlin clan referred to as “the old Yeltsinites” or “the Family,” which is to the advantage of the Petersburg Siloviki. According to the division of labor within the Administration, elections have been traditionally delegated to the Family, who have proven to be highly effective political managers. The resignation of Voloshin on the eve of elections for Duma deputies and president obviously will not strengthen the Administration on the electoral front, and so Putin, having allowed the head of his staff to leave, has preserved the rest of his team if only for the time being. Nevertheless, Voloshin’s departure will inevitably change the nature of the Kremlin’s relations with other political players. The Family was associated with a certain political course (or political style), dubbed “managed democracy” by sharper tongues, which is based on administrative and informational domination in the elections and on tough (but outwardly democratic) methods of marshaling support for the president in the Duma and the regions. It is not out of the question that Voloshin’s departure will mark the beginning of the end of “managed democracy,” which in theory could be replaced either by real democracy or by “managed non-democracy.” I would say the chances of the latter are higher, though I am almost certain that Putin will try to preserve a balance of power in the Kremlin and will not want to rely on only one group — the Siloviki — as this would alienate all the other groups and dangerously limit his power base among the elite. Although the electorate’s reaction to recent events hasn’t been precisely gauged yet, such information will not be very telling — public opinion usually doesn’t notice even serious shifts of this sort. Generally speaking, in light of the public’s aversion to big business, one has to agree that the Yukos affair won’t do the Administration much harm. But it will still create some problems, it would appear. In the “Putin coalition” — that bloc of voters who are ready to vote for the President — there is one significant social stratum that does not harbor prejudice against private enterprise and does not support suppressive measures against it. This is the youth. If Putin wants to win in a single round next March, he cannot allow himself to lose the support of this group. It is entirely likely that the noise surrounding the Khodorkovsky affair can also rouse a “sleeping dog”— the middle class of small business owners who, though not too politically active thus far, now recognize that they have something to lose. These sentiments are already clearly visible at least in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where people regularly read the newspapers. It should also be noted that a majority of the print media is noticeably dramatizing all these events as something like a return to the Stalin era and sympathize more with Khodorkovsky than with the General Prosecutor. The very liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy posed the following question to its audience: If the presidential elections were held this Sunday, whom would you vote for — Putin or Khodorkovsky? A record number of listeners phoned in their answers, and Khodorkovsky won by a ratio of 75 to 25. Thus I foresee higher than usual voter turnout among the prosperous middle class that traditionally does not vote. This will be good news for Yabloko, SPS, and the “against all” option on the ballot more than for the party of power. Another difficulty for the government is the timing of the Yukos events, which coincide with the official start of campaigning in the mass media. On November 7 candidates from the registered parties will begin to appear on television screens daily, often live, and there may be more criticism of the government’s actions than many in the Kremlin expected. Since Yukos had supporters (and not always disinterested ones) in many segments of the political spectrum, this criticism will come from both the right and the left. In conclusion, the Yukos affair’s consequences for the elections aren’t vast, but they are there, mainly in the form of difficulties for the Kremlin as well as for Putin personally. *Trud, June 23, 2003* WHAT ON EARTH IS GOING ON IN RUSSIA? Vyacheslav NIKONOV, president of the Politika Foundation A foreign correspondent whom I know rather well called me the other day, asking anxiously whether great political upheavals lie in store for Russia today. "No, as far as I know. Why?" I replied. That was followed by listing the developments which he could not account for. The liberal Yabloko party joins hands with the communists and even with Zhirinovsky's LDPR in a vote on no confidence in the cabinet appointed by Vladimir Putin. The media, prompted by a group of well-known political analysts, discuss in earnest an alleged prospect of an oligarchic coup against the president. St. Petersburg, the second largest city in Russia, remains to be without a governor, who was urgently summoned to Moscow and given a post of deputy prime minister. It is very rarely that governors were called to Moscow before the end of their term of office. I tried to calm down the foreign observer of developments in this country. These developments have a quite peaceful explanation. All significant events that are taking place and will take place on Russia's political scene this year will almost entirely be associated with the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, and election of regional authorities. The proposed vote of no confidence in the government is most directly associated with the election campaign. Only naive people can think that Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky and Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov really tried to bring about the cabinet's resignation. According to the Constitution, to send the government packing, the State Duma is to vote by a simple majority for its resignation twice, and the opposition has only one-third of the seats in the State Duma. After which the president has to dissolve either the cabinet or the Duma. Even if we imagine the impossible - that no confidence is voted for twice in parliament - it is unlikely that Putin will find communist arguments more convincing than the results of the cabinet's work. The results are not too impressive, but Russia is now among the five countries with the highest rate of economic development. Behind the no-confidence vote is a clear calculation by the political technologists of the left- and right-wing opposition. They are not stupid people - they conduct their own public opinion studies and produce recommendations for their party leaderships. In recent months they recommended, first, to consolidate their electorate, which is mainly displeased with the present conditions of their life, and remind the electorate that it has not displayed its opposition attitudes for too long. It is really difficult to expect a spontaneous demonstration of opposition from the Communist Party and Yabloko - they are far from poor people and most of them are quite satisfied with their own life. Second, the consultants of the opposition are alarmed by the growing capabilities of United Russia and suggest leaving that pro-presidential party no chance to win over additional votes by feigning mild dissatisfaction with the cabinet. Having used the tactics of forestalling criticism, the Communist Party and Yabloko, and also Zhirinovsky who joined them at the last moment, may boast successful completion of one action in the election campaign. The sally against the oligarchs is a bit more complicated game with many moves in, but it has an impressive component of the election campaign. The point is that some financial and industrial groups have become too active sponsors of various political forces, including those that clearly belong to the opposition, which alarmed both rivals and influential groups in and near the Kremlin. The present attack on the oligarchs is meant as a stern warning to the biggest businessmen that they should be more discriminating in their political preferences and tone down their ardor in the election campaign. And the transfer of Vladimir Yakovlev from St. Petersburg to Moscow is nothing but setting the stage for the forthcoming gubernatorial elections in St. Petersburg, the hometown of the president. In recent years many people in the Kremlin considered Yakovlev to be the very Carthage that must inevitably be destroyed. Back in 1996, Yakovlev, then the first vice mayor of St. Petersburg, left the team of the then mayor Anatoly Sobchak and outstripped him in the election race. The loud scandals around Yakovlev's alleged ties with the Mafia and his improper spending of the budget money were used merely as additional arguments for making claims to him by the present presidential team. Not long ago Yakovlev was deprived of a possibility of running for another term, and then the stage was cleared for another candidate (Valentina Matviyenko is named most often as a possible one), so that the ex-governor and his team could not greatly influence the elections. And the post of vice prime minister for housing, municipal service and roads is not a place where one can display great achievements and retain this post for long. However, I would like to be mistaken here. And may nothing surprise you during the election season. *Trud, No. 72, April 19, 2003* WHAT WILL RUSSIA DO IF THE USA PRESSURISES SYRIA? Vyacheslav NIKONOV, president of the Politika Foundation I was in the USA when the Iraqi war ended. Meeting with dozens of experts, journalists and politicians, taking part in conferences and watching the round-the-clock media coverage of the situation, I tried, above all, to determine what damage the war did to the Russia-US partnership. Relations with the USA, the world's only superpower, are extremely important to any country, including Russia. My first impressions and feelings were not optimistic. Russia has greatly surprised the USA, where nobody expected it to take such a harsh anti-American stand. The fact that Moscow sometimes spoke even harsher than the Arab countries did was duly noted. Those in the US Administration and academic circles who were sympathetic to Russia were criticised and pushed back for failure to predict that Russia would stand by Saddam Hussein to the last. They could not forecast our logic, which seemed utterly unreasonable. But the hawks, who had initially denounced rapprochement with Russia as a gross mistake of George Bush, were happy. What else could you expect from Russians? they seemed to say. The developments of the past few weeks engendered more problems. Information about alleged Russian arms deliveries to Iraq was consonant with Russia's violation of the UN Security Council's sanctions against Iraq, which Russia had supported. In general, Russia was mentioned on television, if at all, along with France and Syria, which the Americans saw as the allies of Saddam Hussein. Germany has been "forgiven" but negative feelings for France have been growing. On the list of most hateful politicians, Jacques Chirac was put only slightly below Saddam Hussein. And the invitation of the French President to St. Petersburg did not add sympathy for Russia. Both analysts and the general public were shocked by the multi-thousand anti-war meeting at the US Embassy in Moscow at a time when all television channels were showing US troops in Baghdad and crowds of cheering Iraqis. The impression was that Moscow was situated on some other planet. By and large, there were reasons to doubt that the Russia-US partnership had a future. But the more I talked with Americans, read newspapers and watched television, the more I thought that not everything was lost yet. Happily, there was little information from Russia because France took the main blow. I noticed that "negative" information about Russia was not repeated by one television channel or newspaper after another. It appeared that Washington was deliberately let drop the shows that could potentially explode Russia-US relationship. I believe the reason is that the improvement of relations with Russia was proclaimed by President Bush two years ago as a US foreign policy priority. The White House is not in a hurry to denounce this line as wrong, as this would redirect the blow at the Chief Executive. The opposition, though it is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Moscow, does not dare yet criticise President Bush, who is extremely popular in the country now. The statement of Vladimir Putin, who said that Russia did not wish defeat to the USA, had a positive effect and greatly softened the tone of commentaries in the USA. I am convinced that Bush will attend the celebrations of the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg, unless something extraordinary happens. The warming of bilateral relations, which Russia needs no less than the USA does, is possible. But I do not think they will soon become as warm as they were in 2001-02. Neither do I think that Russia has a good chance of preserving its positions in post-Saddam Iraq. There will be many more trials. I hope to God that the "trial by Iraq" is over and no fresh proof of our military collaboration with the defeated regime will be found there. But we are facing a trial by Syria. It does not look as if the Americans plan to use force there, but they will use the threat of force to demand the liquidation of Hezbollah-type organisations there. How will Russia react to such a demand? *April 10, 2003.* www.washprofile.org Looking Ahead: Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century An Interview with Vyacheslav Nikonov Washington Profile News Service Vyacheslav Nikonov is the President of the Polity Foundation. Q: The conflict in Iraq has led to a cooling off in relations between Russia and the US. Where do you see the relationship going? I would hope that this is a temporary phenomenon, and that the current increase in tension between Russia and the US will not last, that disagreements over Iraq will not become a start-off point for more confrontation, but on the contrary, an episode that will lead to rapprochement. Although it's difficult for me to say if that's how things will develop. Soon the election campaigns are starting in Russia, and there is a danger that anti-American sentiment will be exploited and become institutionalized as a result of the elections. That would be bad. On the other hand, Russian foreign policy depends on the president, who doesn't check to see what the Duma and the Federation Council are doing at every moment. To a great extent, the future of Russian-American relations will depend on the president's position, even though he's not 100% free to do as he wishes. When Putin sought to align with the US after 9/11, he was definitely marching ahead of 90% of the Russian political elite, which is tainted with anti-Americanism. Q: Some leaders of former Soviet republics supported the US. Has this affected their relations with Russia? It wouldn't be wise to scold your allies or former allies for having a sovereign foreign policy. In any case this behavior was pragmatic. There was a conflict in Georgia, over American recon planes that flew too close to Russia, which made some people in Moscow nervous. But it wasn't directly related to the Georgian stance on Iraq. Q: What Russian interests, if any, can Moscow expect to maintain once the war is over? I think there's no perspective for that. Russia had one serious trump card, which is could have used to guarantee its interests in a post-Saddam Iraq - the Security Council vote. But after that failed, Russia was left holding all the cards. Which is a shame. Russia had considered the war prima facie illegal, and did not see a possibility to bargain over Russian support for the operation. As the Foreign Ministry is trying to prove, Russian contracts in Iraq were legitimate, and should be honored after the war. Here we can expect some disappointment, which could be another basis for dissatisfaction with America and a worsening in relations. Although, in my opinion, Russia could have behaved in a much more pragmatic manner. I greatly admire the Chinese stance - they didn't back away from their principles, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the US position, but they didn't sour relations with America. Q: What has been the Russian response to the appearance of American bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia? There's not a single response to anything in Russia. For many in the foreign policy establishment in Russia, it was a threat. Those who supported cooperation with the US said: thank God the Americans have destroyed the Taliban, because we were speculating about a war with them just a couple years ago. Now the problem has disappeared, the Americans took care of it. The opponents argued that there was nothing positive about that, because it weakened the Central Asian governments' dependency on Russia. The Talibs had Uzbekistan by the collar, so it went along Russia. Not this pressure is gone, Americans have fortified themselves in Central Asia, which is a threat to Russian national interests. My view is that US presence in Central Asia weakens Russian influence - including in a number of practical issues, having to do with transport corridors, energy transport etc. On the other hand, Americans stabilized the region and gave some regional governments to reap the benefits of globalization, which is a rather good thing. Moreover, if Russia had served as the defender of Western civilization against the East, as many think, then now the US has taken up the task, which should be welcomed. Q: What is Russia trying to accomplish in the Near East and Central Asia? There are discussions among the politicians of what is the greatest threat to Russia. One faction thinks the main threat is from the south, the "belt of instability" from the Balkans to China. That's the source of terrorist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Another faction thinks the US is the greatest threat. Therefore, the south presents an opposition - and possibly even a counterbalance - to the United States. This is where the wide-spread sympathy for the Iraqis come from. Iraqis were being perceived, often justly, as victims of aggression. Anti-American sentiment swells up during US military actions. Naturally, for those who consider America the main threat, the south is just a peripheral problem. And for those who view the south as the main problem, they formulate policy to prevent threats to Russian security from that region. Q: Russia is trying to pacify Chechnya, while the US is undertaking similar actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Is there a workable mechanism for solving these kinds of problems? Of course not, or else these kinds of problems would not arise. There are approximately 40 countries in the world today that have a problem with separatism and continuing military actions. These conflicts, especially if they are steeped in ethnic or religious animosity, can last decades, even centuries. There are no solutions for them. We can see this clearly in the example of Great Britain, which still cannot rid itself of the Northern Ireland problem. Chechnya is another old wound, one that has been bleeding for almost 200 years with no end in sight. Of course, political rapprochement is possible, and so is the creation of a power structure deemed legitimate by the Chechen population, one that can be negotiated with. But this doesn't mean that incursions by groups of warriors would cease. Those can go on for many more years. In Afghanistan, the US did not propose to create an exemplary democratic government. It's likely such a thing is impossible, in a society that's not yet even fully feudal. They had very limited goals: to destroy the Taliban, to take control of Kabul, ad to give a free hand to the regional commanders, who became the rulers of various provinces. In Iraq, everything will be different. This is an organized society that can create an effective center of power. I don't believe in an Islamic democracy, much less an Arab democracy, but the pre-conditions for a more-or-less normal society do exist there. And so is the potential for economic growth, in the form of oil. Iraq has more of it than Russia. Q: Where do you see the world in 15-20 years? Will things settle? Things never settle. The world society is always developing. Russia will likely become an independent center of power. It is, for the most part, not integrated into the European structures. It's hard to imagine Russia as a significant member of NATO or the EU. In the East, there is nothing to integrate into. So Russia, in view of its size and internal peculiarities, is fated to become an independent and autonomous center of power. Regarding the global system, it will oscillate from a unipolar domination by the US to a multipolar world. The US will try to show that they can do everything everywhere, but this will not turn out to be the case. In one of my articles I characterized the 21st century system as a return to the "balance of powers" system at the end of the 19th century, only on a global scale. Yes, the US has an advantage in a number of parameters, but this domination is nothing exceptional. The American economy was a larger fraction of the world economy in 1945. China's role in the world economy of the 17^th century was greater than America's role today. There will be a certain balance of power, and I cannot imagine the possibility of a war between the great powers, if only because they all have nuclear capability. Regarding the conflicts on the periphery, they will persist. Just like in the 19^th century, when the great powers almost never fought among themselves, but maintained an active foreign policy. This system is fairly stable; in any case, during the time of the "balance of power" in late 19th-early 20^th century, Europe enjoyed a period of peace. Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 49, March 21, 2003 POSSIBLE EFFECT OF MILITARY OPERATION IN IRAQ ON RUSSIA-U.S. RELATIONS Expert answer Krasnaya Zvezda questions: 1. As regards lawfulness of the use of force against Iraq in terms of international law, do the U.S. actions in defiance of an impressive part of the world community spell an end for international institutions like, say, the UN? 2. What will be the effect of the situation around Iraq on Russia in general and on U.S.-Russia relations in particular? Vyacheslav NIKONOV: 1. The consequences for international law will be bad, of course. Though, perhaps, we should not exaggerate here - international law has been a victim of all armed conflicts over the past half a century. You must admit that very rarely military operations are conducted in conformity with international law and UN sanctions. Today, too, we are witnessing yet another instance of its violation. 2. The war in Iraq is not our war. Therefore any developments in Iraq would spell certain losses for Russia. At present, in my view, Vladimir Putin has largely ensured support for Russia's course, especially in the Muslim countries. At the same time Russia's positions in Iraq have obviously suffered. I do not think that in post-Saddam Iraq we will have any possibility to influence the situation in that country. And, of course, definite damage will be done to Russia-U.S. relations. For the time being, I cannot say how bad that damage will be. *Moscow Times, March 6, 2003* How to Avoid Losing the War in Iraq Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the Fond Politika think tank, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. The invasion of Iraq led by the United States and Britain -- expected any day now -- is not going to be a "Russian war." The view of the public and the political elite in this country is that such a war is not justified either from a legal or moral standpoint. Russia is perfectly happy with the status quo, both for the reasons officially stated (the dangerous precedent of unilateral military action undertaken without UN Security Council authorization, and the loss of trade and economic links with Baghdad) as well as for reasons less openly expressed. Russia is quite content with the existing sanctions regime, which prevents the unfettered flow of Iraqi oil onto the world market and the attendant depression of world oil prices. However, the time has come to make serious decisions based on an understanding of the indisputable fact that war is inevitable, as is the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Thank goodness President Vladimir Putin, while coming out in favor of a peaceful solution to the conflict, has nonetheless kept all his options open and has managed not to damage relations with any major world leader. The mood prevailing among the political class is very similar to the mood that reigned during NATO's operation in Kosovo. Back then, the country's entire diplomatic capital was expended on "anti-Americanism" and defending Slobodan Milosevich -- with the result that Russia's influence in that part of the world fell to zero. However, while support for Milosevich then can be explained (the fraternal feelings between Russians and Serbs, historical opposition to Islamic expansion in the Balkans, etc.), the sympathies many of our politicians, including the Communists, profess for Hussein is rather mysterious. It is no secret that the Iraqi dictator butchered his own communists at the start of his reign. Kurds and Iranians -- friends of the Soviet Union and Russia -- were murdered by the tens of thousands using, among other things, mustard and nerve gas. Hussein has not repaid his outstanding debts to us, and not because he could not -- debts to the French and Germans have been serviced meticulously. And even perched on the brink of war, Hussein could not find any better way to express his gratitude to Russia for its support than to announce that Iraq is breaking off its West Qurna oil field contract with LUKoil, Mashinoimport and Zarubezhneft. Moreover, these companies were punished only because they did not stray outside the constraints set by UN sanctions. Many well-informed experts and politicians consider it essential to use all means to oppose the United States -- if for nothing else than to form an alliance of nations to counter unipolarity and preserve the existing system of international law. While these goals may well be noble, they cannot be achieved in the immediate future. As events in recent weeks have demonstrated, there are no major states today that are prepared to commit themselves firmly to anti-American policies. Germany and France, due to the political balance of forces domestically, are capable of defying Washington on certain issues for a short period of time, but they will nonetheless remain allies of the United States. Saving face and restoring good relations with the United States are no less a concern than saving Iraq. Those Russian politicians and experts who assume that in the foreseeable future an alliance with Moscow -- and moreover on an anti-American platform -- is going to be more attractive than an alliance with the United States display breathtaking naivete. Our Chinese counterparts are already surprised at the toughness of the Russian position vis-a-vis Iraq. For Beijing, it is much more important not to damage trade relations with the United States (trade volumes between China and Russia are one-tenth of those between China and the United States) than to defend Iraq, where China does not have any particular interests. I very much doubt that France or China will veto a U.S.-British UN resolution. Russia may find itself in the role of lone defender of Hussein's regime. To play this role would mean to relinquish all influence whatsoever over subsequent events, as well as the possibility of protecting Russia's national interests in a post-Hussein Iraq. And we are unlikely to save the international legal system -- in fact, truth be told, there is not much to save at this point. In the past half-century, there have been many wars around the world, but with the minor exceptions of sending an army into Korea in the 1950s and the use of force against Hussein in the first Gulf War, they did not have UN authorization. The Soviet Union occupied Kabul, NATO bombed Belgrade etc. without paying much attention to the UN Security Council. That's not to say that UN Security Council authorization is not at the center of the international legal system. But it may prove impossible to assert the dictatorship of law and universal justice on a global scale in the coming days. Furthermore, there are other priorities that can be defended and should not fall victim to anti-American sentiments: First is the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hussein has for some time possessed chemical and biological (but not nuclear) weapons in ample quantities. And there are no grounds to believe that over the past four years, having kicked out UN inspectors, he has been actively engaged in secretly destroying his cache. Second is the war against international terrorism and Islamic extremism. Hussein openly sponsors, for example, Palestinian terrorists. Third is the maintenance of good relations with the world's leading powers, including the United States. Finally, surely a major priority is the preservation -- as far as is possible -- of Russia's commercial interests in Iraq after the war. If we do not reach an agreement with the United States now about the rules of the game after the war, we will lose our commercial presence altogether. Moreover, time is not on our side. When the first U.S. rocket hits Iraqi soil, Russia's negotiating position will also take a major hit. What can realistically be done and what not? First and foremost, it is not in Russia's interest to undertake any actions at the UN Security Council that could marginalize Russia and keep it from participating in major issues of international politics. Russia needs to maintain a permanent dialogue with all the major players in the Iraq crisis -- not only with those opposed to military action, but also with the future victors. It is clear that Russia will not be able to retain its position in Iraq completely intact -- losses are inevitable and we should not have any illusions on this count, but every effort must be made to minimize losses. If Russia cannot preserve all its contracts with Iraq it must attempt to save the most important ones, in particular the oil contracts. Talks are no guarantee of success, but without them Russia will surely get nothing. Upgrading the level of negotiators on the Russian side may improve the chances of reaching an acceptable agreement (certain issues can only be decided by the highest echelon of state officials), as would the precise formulation of Russia's position -- i.e. what specifically Russia wants to stake a claim on in postwar Iraq and on what conditions. No one else is going to help Russia formulate its national interests, or assist in realizing these interests. Russia is not capable of preventing a war. But it is still capable of not losing out in the war.

		© Copyright Фонд "Политика", 2003