Publications
Cool Peace
Izvestia, February 23, 2007
When Vladimir Putin gave his instantly famous speech in Munich, the faces of those in the audience were either frightened or strained. The frightened ones were the politically correct Germans, who had already been forbidden by their mothers and school teachers from talking to the big boys in such a sharp tone. The strained ones were the Americans, who are themselves used to talking sharply to others at Western conferences. Thus, Putin sounded extremely gentle compared to what I happened to hear about Russia from Senator John McCain, who was also sitting in the hall in Munich and was later more indignant than anyone.
The reaction to our president's speech was quite hysterical, and the American press surpassed itself in its choice of vocabulary for its newspaper headlines. But what attracted one's attention besides the excessive emotion was essentially the complete lack of analysis of Putin's reasoning. Which is not surprising.
The president said nothing that the world had not heard from, say, Jacques Chirac. He said nothing which the Americans themselves have not already heard from the leaders in their own presidential race, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, and the leadership of the Democratic majority in Congress. He said nothing with which global public opinion, including that of the West, would disagree. A poll carried out in Germany immediately after the Munich conference had finished showed that almost 70% of Germans shared Putin's criticism of the United States. The head of the Russian government voiced the thoughts of an overwhelming majority of people who do not believe that the United States' one-sided policy with its excessive emphasis on military force is productive.
This policy is becoming increasingly unpopular within the United States itself, where a wave of arrogant hegemony -- we alone can do everything and do it now -- has come to nothing. This has manifested itself in the growing popularity of critics of the Iraq war and supporters of multilateral diplomacy.
Many Western diplomats and journalists have been asking the following question recently: Why has Putin suddenly lost his patience now? Well, first and foremost, it is not just now. The president has expressed similar thoughts before in completely different contexts. Although this is of course the first time Putin has expressed his opinions in such a focused way. I think that two main events served as the catalyst. Firstly, the statement made by US Defense Secretary Gates at the Congressional hearings where he tried to attribute the need for a record increase in military spending to the uncertainty of the situation in Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, thus, virtually consigning our country to the "axis of evil." Secondly, the decision to deploy components of US national missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. They could not have been unaware in Washington of how acute Moscow's reaction would be as soon as the subject turned to the strategic military balance.
There are many equations and adages in the world of the most serious (nuclear missile) weapons, one of which goes like this: If someone builds up his shield, he will face great temptation and opportunity to use his sword. Moreover the buildup is happening at our very borders and in precisely the place where they promised Mikhail Gorbachev no military infrastructure would be deployed. Just as they swore not to enlarge NATO. There is no doubt that the deployment of US missile defense components will not make Europe a more secure place. Those doing the deploying should bear in mind that such components are always a target.
In this context it is also worth looking at the statement made by Chief of the General Staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy on Russia's possible withdrawal from the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles concluded by Gorbachev and Reagan in 1987. And the point is not just that when we destroyed these missiles, others -- both Koreas, Iran, Israel and India -- actively commissioned them. The Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was related directly to the overall military-strategic balance and was signed under the conditions of the previous ABM Treaty, from which the United States has unilaterally withdrawn. I am more than certain that, had the prospect of US missile defense advancing into Eastern Europe loomed at one time, there would be simply no intermediate- and shorter-range missiles at all. Why the US is encouraging a new round in the nuclear missile arms race is not entirely clear.
The events of the past few days have forced us to start talking about a return to the "Cold War." In my opinion a return of this nature is by definition impossible. The "Cold War" was the name given to the global confrontation between two world systems which considered each other deadly enemies and which was fought in every corner of the planet. Now those two systems do not exist, and the situation is unlikely to repeat itself. Russia does not consider Western countries to be its foes, just as they do not see us as an enemy (unless of course Gates' statement is a dramatic shift in the pattern). No one, at least on the Russian side, is planning on stockpiling weapons and giving a symmetrical response to US military programs, undermining their economy. Our military spending was around 2.5% of GDP and will remain that way. GDP is growing ...
Everyone has felt the cold winds. But these are not the winds of a "cold war", but rather of a cool peace. And a change in the political climate is possible, a change that may take any direction, moreover.
A number of analysts have rushed to connect the exacerbation of the international situation with the recent government reshuffle which led to a noticeable increase in the political standing of now former Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, who became first vice premier. I believe that if there was really talk of the country turning into an army camp, then the head of the defense department would have been a general rather than a taxman, which is what Anatoliy Serdyukov was until recently. His appointment should be seen as an attempt to establish financial order in the Ministry of Defense. And Ivanov's promotion should be seen as Putin's plan to seriously stimulate a surge of technology in the civilian sectors, since it is no secret to anyone that the main source of high technology in the world is the defense industry. And the fact that Ivanov's chances of getting the presidential post are simultaneously growing is very indirectly related to the cool peace. For the time being.
The Putin Strategy
© "Russia in Global Affairs". ¹ 1, January - March 2005
Vyacheslav Nikonov, Doctor of Science (History), is Chairman of the Polity Foundation and Deputy Chairman of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. The article was originally published in Russian in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, December 22, 2004.
Russian President Vladimir Putin remains a mystery for many people. There is a popular joke in Russia that he has finally decided on a Korean model for his countryÕs development, but has yet to decide which of the two models to choose. His opponents deny the president and his team the ability for strategic thinking, or view their policies as a return to the totalitarian past. PutinÕs supporters have never seen a complete strategy, yet apparently they are ready to support the president even without the benefit of a strategy.
DOES
PUTIN REALLY HAVE A STRATEGY?
I believe that it is possible to see a strategy in PutinÕs actions. Some people may not like
it, however, and I myself do not consider it ideal. At the same time, in light
of the sequential logic of his actions, Putin is attempting to solve the top-priority
problems confronting Russian society.
I do not think that Putin had a strategy when he, quite unexpectedly for
everybody including himself, became prime minister and prospective ÒheirÓ to the Russian presidency. At that time, Russia was
facing a pile of problems which were unprecedented in scale for any country. In
December 1999, Vladimir Putin, at the time still a prime minister, published
his first policy article entitled Russia at the
Turn of the Century. In it, he wrote bluntly: ÒRussia is going through one of the most
difficult periods of its centuries-old history. Perhaps for the first time in
the last 200-300 years, it is facing the real danger of finding itself in the
second or even third echelon of world states.Ó
Putin was not exaggerating.
Two days after the article was published, Boris Yeltsin resigned from his
presidential post.
INITIAL
REALITY
Putin found himself in the position of an heir who, upon reading the will,
discovers that he has inherited a million debts.
The new Russian president was suddenly responsible for a country which in the
previous eight years had lost half of its economy; furthermore, it had just
passed through a severe financial default. Russia was a
backward country with a budget comparable to that of a large American city,
with over half of its population living below the poverty line. Many Russians
had not been paid their salaries or pensions for months.
Finally, the economy was overburdened with many social commitments inherited
from the Communist times, which no country, not even richest, could cope with. Big
business, which had received property worth billions of dollars from the
Kremlin, ruled the country via YeltsinÕs ÒFamily.Ó This powerful group appointed
ministers, adopted convenient laws, elected governors on the territories it
controlled, and enjoyed unlimited access to state resources, but it never
developed the habit of paying taxes.
Actually, Russia was
not governed at all. It could be described as a democracy only by a person with
a very rich imagination: the regime was a strange mixture of anarchy and
oligarchy, with only occasional democratic headway. There was no common legal
space in the country. None of the numerous Russian regions experienced any
visible economic reform or democracy, but incompetence, nepotism,
irresponsibility and embezzlement could be found with the naked eye.
Russian society, which had suffered from the Òlost country syndrome,Ó was absolutely disoriented. People
were weary of reforms and only desired some semblance of order from the
authorities. During this time, there was a real possibility that the Communist
Party would stage a comeback. The country lacked a normal system of political
parties, which is the backbone of any democratic state.
At the time, Russia was
fighting a war that it did not want. War was declared on Russia by
Wahabi radicals who wish to build a caliphate that would stretch from the Black
Sea to the Caspian. Beginning from at least 1999, Russian
federal troops in Chechnya faced
not just rank-and-file Arab mercenaries, but Arab commanders as well. The
Russian forces, responsible for providing for the nationÕs security, experienced many
setbacks. These were due to the underfunded special services, disorganized
military reforms and a ragged and demoralized army; nuclear-powered submarines
were rusting in port, while the strategic nuclear arms were alarmingly
degrading. The Gorbachev-Yeltsin breakthrough to the West had stalled. The task
required by the government, therefore, was to rebuild a dismantled state. It would
be difficult to name a more difficult job than this.
GENERAL
CONCEPT
PutinÕs
original strategy rested on the pragmatic goal of fighting for RussiaÕs survival. That goal outweighed
all ideological considerations. At the same time, the president understood from
the very beginning that a serious modernization breakthrough was needed. RussiaÕs main strategic goal was to become
a modern great power that would be economically strong, technologically
advanced, socially developed and politically influential.
This strategic goal could be achieved only after Russia had:
- completed the
most fundamental revolution of the late 20th century which destroyed the
Communist Soviet Union, and stabilized the political system on the basis of
democracy and free markets;
- created a state
mechanism capable of implementing the required reforms;
- formed a normal
economic environment that could ensure long-term economic growth;
- created favorable
international conditions for its internal development;
- overcome the
societal atomization and begun the process of consolidating the Russian nation.
WHO
ARE WE?
Putin has not proposed any new national idea, but he has resolutely abandoned
the old Communist idea. Whatever the liberal critics of Putin may say, the
president is making a firm break with the totalitarian past. Putin suggests
that society look for landmark concepts in RussiaÕs history to create a new identity, and
there are examples of this taking place today: The main Communist holiday Ð November 7, the day of the 1917
October Revolution Ð has
been abolished, obviously at the presidentÕs suggestion. From czarist Russia, we have inherited
the two-headed eagle borrowed by Ivan III from Byzantium; furthermore, Russia
has recently re-introduced November 4th celebrations Ð the day of MoscowÕs liberation in 1612, which
coincides with the day of the Kazan icon of the Mother of God; then there was
the introduction of the state tricolor, borrowed by Peter the Great from the
Dutch. From Soviet times, we have inherited the national anthem Ð or rather its music, which was
composed by Alexander Alexandrov during the countryÕs liberation from Nazi troops; the
anthem now contains post-Soviet lyrics. Putin places much more emphasis than
his predecessors on traditional civic values: patriotism, morals, family and
religion. He is a believer, and Orthodox principles are not an abstract notion
for him.
The new Russia,
although changing, has established a strong connection to its former self.
COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY
Putin understands perfectly well that no Soviet recipes can help him fulfill
his primary task of implementing a qualitative leap forward in economic
development. His economic program is very simple - and very ambitious. Putin wants to make Russia
compatible with the global economy, and create a normal, globally accepted
economic environment which is attractive for domestic and foreign investments
into the economy. These measures must boost economic growth and double the GDP
within ten years (although Putin has never specified the starting year for this
decade). Economic growth is the focal point in PutinÕs strategy.
In fact, President Putin launched a new round of market reforms, which had
never been completed in the early 1990s. What his team has done for reducing
taxes, opening the economy for global competition in order to meet WTO
membership criteria, and for carrying out social, pension and public utilities
reforms is far beyond the intentions of the reformers from the early Yeltsin
times.
At the same time, PutinÕs
strategy provides for equal, and possibly even stronger, state control over
several strategic economic sectors, of which the fuel/energy sector is the most
important for Russia. There
will be no nationalization program (incidentally, it is only the Anglo-Saxon
countries where the energy sectors are not the property of the state). At the
same time, state-owned segments of the economy will not be reduced either;
rather they will increase, taking into account the prospects of
Yuganskneftegaz.
The relations between the state and business have been complicated considerably
by the YUKOS case and, on a broader scale, by the relations between Putin and
the oligarchs. In Russia, one
often hears the question: ÒWho of
the oligarchs will be the next one?Ó Since his first days in office, the President has
sent several unequivocal ÒmessagesÓ to big business. The first one
was: ÒPay
taxes and display social responsibility.Ó The second message was: ÒThe federal policy is the KremlinÕs business.Ó The third message was: ÒThere can be no saints among the
oligarchs.Ó All of
these points have been ÒappointedÓ in one way or another by the
Kremlin, and often in violation of the law. Therefore, oligarchs can be sacked
if they ignore the first and second messages; the disfavor, which befell Boris
Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, seems logical on this
account. These individuals made obvious attempts to destabilize state power,
while caring little to observe the law and pay taxes. The answer to the
question ÒWho
will be next?Ó is
obvious: the one who will follow suit.
COMBATING
POVERTY
Eradicating poverty in Russia is one
of PutinÕs most
ambitious goals. Economic growth, the reduction of unemployment, and the
repayment of overdue pensions and wages have reduced the number of people
living below the subsistence level to 18 percent. By the end of PutinÕs second presidency this figure is
predicted to decrease to 10 percent. Although Russia is
still far behind the developed countries as regards the standard of living, it
has already broken loose from the poverty trap, in which almost a majority of
the Russian population found themselves in the 1990s.
This is happening amidst a sweeping social reform, which, judging by public
reaction, has been the most painful for Russia. The
essence of this reform has been to revise the stateÕs excessive social obligations
which are not backed financially. No country can afford to pay allowances or
provide benefits to two-thirds of its population. The main principle of the new
social policy is to provide support only for those who really need it, and to
increase the size of allowances paid to such people from the money thus saved. Another
principle is the monetization of fringe benefits.
GOVERNABILITY
It was not unheard of for Boris Yeltsin to fail to show up in his office for
months at a time. The Family, an extra-institutional center of power, played a
much greater role than all the constitutional institutions taken together. Thus,
PutinÕs
strategy is to restore the governability of the country with a heavy reliance
on those institutions Ð at the
expense of their autonomy.
For the first time in the post-Soviet era, there are working pro-presidential
majorities capable of passing reformist laws in both chambers of the Federal
Assembly. This parliament has proclaimed the right to land ownership,
introduced the worldÕs most
liberal tax system, which includes a flat income tax rate of 13 percent, and
has begun to create a normal social infrastructure.
The administrative reform, launched in the spring of 2004, has proven to be the
most sweeping reform ever conducted by a Russian government since RussiaÕs first prime minister Sergei Witte
held office. The obvious Westernization of the Cabinet (the number of
ministries and their functions have almost coincided with those in the American
government), the delimitation of powers between the legislative and purely
executive departments, and the tangible reduction in the number of their CEOs
has brought society closer to the presidentÕs goal of ÒdebureaucratizingÓ the economy. Yet, it is too early to trumpet these
achievements. Like any other reorganization, administrative reform plunged the
government into a stupor when it was first initiated. This does not mean,
however, that this reform is not needed or that it has failed, or that the
countryÕs
leadership does not have enough will to carry it through.
The president continues to emphasize the need for turning the judiciary into a
full-fledged and truly independent branch of state power. He argues that this
can be accomplished by sharply increasing the salaries of judges, which would
make them immune to administrative and financial pressure.
THE
VERTICAL
PutinÕs
strategy in the field of federative relations is aimed at preventing the stateÕs disintegration. Initially, the
top priority of this strategy was to bring regional legislation into line with
federal laws and the constitution. This goal was effectively achieved by means
of a new power institution - the
plenipotentiary representatives of the president in the newly established seven
federal districts. The plenipotentiaries also helped to re-establish MoscowÕs control over local federal
executive bodies, which in the 1990s had been swayed by regional governors. The
Kremlin initiated the process of consolidating the numerous administrative
entities of the Russian
Federation - an absolutely justified move from
the administrative and economic points of view. The latest - and most controversial - stage in the federative reform has
been a transition from the direct election of governors to their election by
the legislative assemblies of the Russian
Federation entities upon
their nomination by the president. PutinÕs statements, in addition to what I have heard from
people in his team, suggest seven reasons explaining the logic of this move.
First, many of the previously elected governors proved to be incompetent and
inadequate. Several failed to report to their office for weeks because of their
addiction to alcohol, while others were directly connected with criminal clans.
Second, elections have a tendency to sharply aggravate the situation in the
multinational regions and bring ethnic conflicts to a head. Candidates often
represent individual ethnic groups, and when one emerges victorious in an
election contest it is perceived as a defeat by the other ethnic groups. Furthermore,
as the term of office of several officials comes to a close in flashpoint
regions (for example, in the North Caucasus, where leaders such as Valery
Kokov, Alexander Dzasokhov, Magomedali Magomedov have brought stability to the
area), these individuals might have been followed by the election of extreme
nationalists. Such a scenario could lead to the resumption of hostilities.
Third, Russia has
seen no reformist or liberal-minded governor elected after 1996. Putin is more
pro-reformist than 95 percent of the governors and 90 percent of the
population.
Fourth, too many governors directly represented the interests of individual
financial groups. Only several (Alexander Khloponin in Krasnoyarsk, for
example) invested in their own regions, while a majority redistributed
resources away from the local population in favor of the corresponding
companies.
Fifth, in some of the regions, the governorsÕ family clans have taken the entire local economy
under their control (or have made attempts to do that).
Sixth, the inefficiency of the governors has forced the federal center to
form a parallel system of executive bodies. This aspect is directly related to
the war against terrorism. Governors nominated by the president and approved by
regional assemblies will have levers of control over the law enforcement
system.
Seventh, international practices have provided arguments against the practice
of electing governors by the population. There are three federations in the
world where governors are elected in such a way. The United
States is the only
successful exception, while the record of the other two federations - Mexico and Brazil - cannot be described as such.
PutinÕs
strategy assigns a great role to local self-government. The 1993 Constitution
has created a very intricate and unviable structure of governance; actually,
the Constitution has omitted the local government level, and bills drawn up by
Dmitry Kozak are intended to restore this function. Further reforms in this
field must create an adequate financial base for solving peopleÕs vital problems at the level where
they most often arise and where they must be addressed - in the regions and in each
individual settlement.
THE
CREATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Putin is sincerely convinced that Russia needs
large, full-fledged political parties. The creation of such parties will be
built along two major avenues. First, it will be necessary to restore the
authoritiesÕ
affiliation to a particular political party. During those years that were
committed to the eradication of the Òdamned legacy of the Soviet Communist PartyÓ unprecedented laws were adopted,
such as prohibiting top state officials from joining any party. After the
executive office, together with the State Duma, are made party-based, it will
become possible to noticeably increase the incentives for the consolidation of
the political parties.
The second avenue is the transition to elections to the State Duma solely by
party lists, which has recently been proposed by the president. For all its
disadvantages, the proportional representation system permits the creation of
major political parties within a short period of time; and large, nationwide
parties will consolidate the stateÕs unity and prevent regional separatism.
Obviously, the president sees no problem in having a large dominant party that
can consolidate the core of the pro-Putin electorate and the administrative
elite, as well as carry out reforms and ensure the continuity of his policy. It
seems that Putin would like to see the transformation of the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation into a
modern social democratic party. Yet, while the Communist leaders continue to
resist the changes, the chances are growing that the Communist electoral niche
will be gradually filled by other leftist and national-patriotic groups. The
president has never created problems for liberals at elections; The Union of
Right Forces (SPS), Yabloko and other liberal parties are the authors of their
own failures as they have never been able to unite. The liberal electorate in Russia is too
small to support more than one serious liberal project, and if the liberal
parties come to understand this, they will undoubtedly have a future.
Presently, it is the advocates of Chechen extremists and their patrons Ð regardless of their political
slant - who the Kremlin administration cannot tolerate.
NATIONAL
SECURITY
Putin has been emphasizing the need to strengthen the national security
organizations - the
armed forces, special services, and law enforcement agencies. The top priority
of the defense reform is increasing the professionalism of the armed forces. This
means increasing the number and improving the quality of the permanent
readiness units. Conscription will be preserved, but the mandatory term will be
reduced to one year. The main emphasis is on compact and mobile special units,
and the development of deterrence forces as an absolute guarantor of the
security of the country; Russia still
has relatively weak conventional armed forces and armaments.
Only consolidated special services and law enforcement agencies can protect the
country from the threat of terror and organized crime. The government is
planning to drastically overhaul the security organizations by re-equipping
them, better coordinating their efforts, and eradicating corruption in their
ranks. The arrests of Òwerewolves
in police uniforms,Ó which
many have described as a populist campaign, in reality reflect a long-term
policy. Finally, there are plans on the table for increasing officer salaries.
Chechnya
remains RussiaÕs most
acute problem - and
will continue to be so for some time. MoscowÕs strategy consists in combining antiterrorism
operations with measures to create and broaden a sphere of influence for the
legitimate secular authorities. This move will aim to improve their
coordination under the aegis of the governing bodies of the Southern
Federal District, rebuild destroyed houses, and create
jobs for the population of the war-ravaged region. The invasion of Ingushetia
and the seizure of a school in Beslan serve as reminders that we are still very
far from the real completion of the counterterrorism operation, not to mention
genuine peace. Nevertheless, progress has been made: last year, human rights
activists recorded dozens of times less human rights violations in Chechnya, which
means that life there is becoming calmer. The operation in Chechnya will
continue until final victory has been achieved, whatever effort this may
require and despite whatever objections the West may have. To this end, I can
definitely say there will be no more Khasavyurt-like deals.
STRATEGY
FOR PEACE
PutinÕs
foreign policy strategy at the beginning of his second presidency was marked by
a high degree of continuity. The developments in Ukraine,
however, may introduce drastic changes into it.
From the very beginning, Putin has been conducting an independent and active
multi-vector policy of a pragmatic Òfather of the nationÓ who is concerned, at the same time, about
the greatness of his nation. While perceiving that the general weakness of the
country remains the greatest threat to RussiaÕs security, he regards foreign policy,
first and foremost, as an instrument for creating favorable conditions for
economic development, improving the investment climate and promoting Russian
business interests abroad. His pronounced pragmatism presupposes setting
foreign-policy tasks that the country is able to fulfill. The President is
undoubtedly an integrationist, which has been adequately demonstrated by RussiaÕs participation in the
international organizations it has already joined (the United Nations, G8), or
entry into organizations to which it may be admitted in the future (the World
Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
Putin will not orient himself to one particular pole of the contemporary world,
but will keep his hands free for contacts in all directions.
In PutinÕs
system of priorities, the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States
have held Ð and
will continue to hold Ð a
prominent place. PutinÕs
favorite brainchild of recent time is the Common Economic Space embracing Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The
prospects for this project, however, may be seriously threatened now that
Victor Yushchenko has come to power in Kiev, as he
is a strong opponent of this project.
RussiaÕs
relations with the West have revealed naturally limiting factors. The main one
remains the fundamental impossibility of RussiaÕs entry into the major European and
Transatlantic organizations Ð the
European Union and NATO. These organizations do not care to see Russia among
their members, and, most likely, Russia has no
need to seek its membership. Moreover, the emphasis that the West places on the
human rights issue, as well as the Ògap in valuesÓ between the West and Russia, serve
as more stumbling blocks in Russia-West relations. Putin does not believe that
he has any problems with building a democratic society, and he will not accept
criticism on human rights. Meanwhile, the development of Russian democracy will
not correspond to Western ideas about this process for quite some time.
The developments in Ukraine
represent the latest complication for Russia. Moscow views
what has happened there not only as an unconstitutional coup, but also as a
large-scale geopolitical operation to overthrow the regime of a CIS country
which is an ally of Russia. It
seems that relations between Russia and
the West may be in for the most serious crisis in recent years.
Under the circumstances, Russia is
destined to remain an independent center of power and one of the few global
actors that have preserved their sovereignty, as well as their personal view on
global developments.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE
There are flaws in PutinÕs strategy, however, and its implementation is
going to face many difficulties. One of the flaws is the lack of a clearly
formulated long-term strategy, and this factor sets a rather narrow time
horizon for PutinÕs policy.
The main factors for economic development are a climate of confidence between
the authorities and businesses, an increased capitalization of Russian
companies, and the freedom of the peopleÕs energy and initiative. Many
of the necessary reforms - for example, in the banking and public utilities
sectors and natural monopolies - have stalled, as has the introduction of a
mortgage system. Much more investment must be made in education (above all, in
the secondary schools), public health, and human capital where quality is a
decisive factor in the global competitiveness of the state.
The main problems in politics are the following:
- improving the mechanism for preparing, making and implementing decisions;
- corruption;
- the quality of the administrative elite;
- stepping up the work of the government;
- explaining state policy to the people;
- ensuring the representation of regional interests in the federal bodies of
power.
Russia must start a real integration of the post-Soviet
space, wherever possible, and think of a new agenda for its relations with the
leading Western countries and their allies.
The Russian presidentÕs job is still one of the most difficult ones in
the world. But Russia is no longer the country it was five years ago. It
is a more consolidated country with a much more effective state.
What is PutinÕs strategy?
How can PutinÕs strategy be described from an ideological point
of view? Liberals criticize this strategy for not being liberal, whereas the
Communists criticize it for not being leftist. Both are right.
PutinÕs strategy is built on the principles of the free
market, a strong state and its security organizations; on an open, independent
and active foreign policy; and on respect for traditions, continuity and
patriotism. According to any of the classifications accepted in the world, such
a set of principles is rather characteristic of right-wing politicians and
conservatives. There are many respectable people among them - from Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer to Ronald
Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Jacques Chirac. Like Putin now, these politicians
were also often accused of having anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies.
Personally, I donÕt think there is a threat of authoritarianism in Russia, and this is not simply because there are numerous
critics of Putin who defame him in the media without risking their freedom,
health or wellbeing. Authoritarianism, in its classical forms, is a rigid legal
or quasi-legal regime which requires absolute subordination. Figuratively
speaking, the man in the center pushes buttons which activate signal lamps
throughout the country, and then everyone hurries to fulfill his orders. In Russia today, the button-pushing does not have such an
obvious effect. The signal lamps have burned out a long time ago, or someone
has removed them, the wires have been sold as non-ferrous scrap, and there is
no saying about the Òdiligence of incorruptible officials.Ó All these factors allay fears that authoritarianism can be built in Russia in the foreseeable future - even if the president had such a goal. Moreover, Russian society has
begun its development from a state which some people describe as complete
chaos. The contemporary Russian regime is an unconsolidated democracy with
elements of the still continuing chaos. Democracies never emerge already
developed. Considering RussiaÕs record of the last 1,000 years, it seems that we
are expecting too much from the 13-year-young Russian democracy.
PutinÕs strategy is not authoritarianism or anarchy, but
a well-functioning and effective democracy, which is developing in line with an
unchanged Russian Constitution.
Andrew Kuchins, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Dmitri Trenin
U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: THE CASE FOR AN UPGRADE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The recent sharp dispute over the Ukrainian presidential elections vividly illustrated the fragile and shallow nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Highly touted in both Washington and Moscow as a “strategic partnership” in 2001, the relationship has drifted and the gap between glowing rhetoric and thin substance has grown. When major policy differences emerge, as over war in Iraq in 2002-2003 and recently over Ukraine, all too easily the U.S.-Russian relationship spirals into “crisis,” and the threat of a “new Cold War” looms.
This sense of drift and the impression that U.S.-Russian relations were heavier on rhetoric than substance motivated the authors in the summer of 2004 to try to develop a common strategic vision about why this relationship matters a great deal now, why it will matter in the future and how to ensure that its potential can be fulfilled. We seek to present how Russia and the United States understand their broader interests in international relations, to what extent their goals and interests overlap and how in the coming years we may be able to increase that overlap. As Russians and Americans, we should view relations with the other party in terms of national needs. The U.S. does matter a lot to Russia’s development, and Russia matters quite a bit to the functioning of the global order. That is in itself a good basis for an upgrade.
The driving factors now and in the foreseeable future that will promote closer U.S. and Russian interests will be mainly in the security and energy realms. Within the realm of security issues, we broadly share interests in combating terrorism and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But despite a rhetorical shared common interest of peace and stability across Eurasia, our competing visions and goals in the former Soviet states, as the recent presidential elections in Ukraine displayed, prevent deep cooperation. Moscow’s status as an energy superpower possessing the largest overall hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) reserves in the world is increasingly significant for U.S. policy and commercial interests.
The United States and Russia cannot afford to find themselves on the path of collision, while collusion remains out of the question. The answer then is patience, coupled with practical steps; consultations and transparency about policies; clarity about the "red lines"; and compromise where core interests are not at stake. We need to concentrate on what’s realistically doable now and in the foreseeable future. Each country makes a choice on the basis of prioritizing its various interests. When interests are compelling enough, such cooperation should not be held hostage, for example, to the pace of Russia’s domestic evolution or the United States’ making its foreign policy more multilateral. To the extent that we can successfully cooperate on more issues, trust will grow, and our perceptions of our interests and how they are in effect tied to values may grow closer as well.
© Copyright Ôîíä "Ïîëèòèêà", 2003